

# THE REFORMED CHURCH REVIEW

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## I.

### JESUS' MESSIANIC CONSCIOUSNESS.

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Did Jesus believe himself to be the Messiah? Was he the Jewish Messiah? What was his idea of Messiahship? This whole question is surrounded with great difficulties.

The first is that of entering the inner life of another, of discovering his estimation of himself and his sense of his relation to the current ideas of his day. To investigate the inner shrine of an ordinary person is difficult; of Jesus it is well nigh impossible.

The second difficulty is that we have to approach this question through past modes of thought. The gospels are Jewish Christian estimates and admirations of Jesus expressed in the current religious and political language and forms of thought of the first century, many of which have only very obscure meaning for us and can only be apprehended after the most thorough research. But the importance of this subject, the conviction that it lies back of and is a necessary condition to a valid understanding of the gospel of the kingdom and of Jesus himself makes the effort an inspiring venture.

## I. THE UNIVERSAL ELEMENT IN THE MESSIANIC IDEA.

The word Messiah being a Hebrew term, found in the literature of the Jewish people, leads some to suppose that the Messianic idea had its origin among the Hebrews and is limited to the Jewish and through it to the Christian religion. But the word Messiah expresses an idea far older and wider than the Hebrew people. It is as deep as human need and as wide as the human race.

The three characteristic forms of thought in which primitive man expresses his relation to the phenomena of life are: (1) A sense of fear before the powers that seem to threaten and destroy him; (2) a yearning for and a dependence upon some beneficent power to ward off these dangers and protect him from them; (3) his happiness when he is thus protected or escapes, and his perplexity and misery when not. These are parts of the native furniture of the human soul. It belongs to us as human beings. It exists long before temples, altars or Bibles. It builds temples, writes Bibles and formulates creeds.

The first of these, the sense of fear, is at first only perhaps a physical quaking before physical danger, but it develops into trembling of the soul before moral evil. It grows from danger of body to danger of soul and personifies the evils of nature into devils and a Satan.

The second expects unseen powers, gods and spirits to befriend the helpless. It develops into tribal deities, saviour heroes, Messiahs and Christ. It grows from physical relief to spiritual redemption.

The third is the consequence of release from fear. It expresses itself in belief in the golden age, in the kingdom of God, in Paradise and heaven. Sin and Satan are words to express ideas developed from man's fear of adverse powers. Redemption and Salvation are words to express ideas developed from his dependence upon a saviour hero, and heaven is a word to express ideas developed from his belief in the overthrow of all adversaries and his complete bliss thereby assured.

The early myths of all peoples manifest these fundamental beliefs. The roots of the Messianic hope therefore run back beyond the prophets, back beyond the Hebrew nation itself, down into the soil of popular imagination.

## II. THE VARIOUS JEWISH IDEAS.

When we leave the broad universal field and confine ourself to the Hebrew literature we find the Messianic idea has diversified meanings. It passes through various stages. Among the earliest prophets this idea is simply a return of a Davidic king, who will reunite Israel and bring the peace and prosperity that characterized David's reign. At times it seems almost a belief in the return of David himself. When, however, the great prophets sought to restate this old belief in the supremacy of Jehovah over their adversaries (for Jehovah was their saviour hero), this Messianic hope came to mean more and more a special king with special prerogatives. He was to be Jehovah's representative endowed with Jehovah's power and sense of justice; and Jehovah through him would set up the reign of Righteousness at Jerusalem, to which all nations would be compelled to come. When the people were forced into exile then their faith suffered a shock. They first thought Jehovah had failed, or had deserted them. Then they reinterpreted that event as Jehovah's punishment for their purification and his preparation of them for the great Day of Jehovah when he would subdue all enemies and restore Israel. But these prophecies never were fulfilled. Israel passed from national failure to national destruction. The more the Jewish people wallowed in miserableism the more fantastic became their belief in their future. The apocalyptic literature is the pictorial expression of forlorn hopes. When they could no longer expect a restoration through the normal political channels, then they fell to taking these great political hopes of the prophets and giving them all kinds of allegorical enigmatical unearthly meanings, and the Messianic idea passed from the first stages of a great and good successor of David

to a heavenly visitor endowed with magical powers, who would sweep in upon the earth from out the clouds with a shout of vengeance and by the might of sheer omnipotence scatter all their enemies and reinstate the Jews in Jerusalem in bliss and reveling in prosperity. Apocalypse is thus degenerated prophecy. When Jesus appeared, the nation with its traditional hope of Davidic splendor preached by its great teachers, now for centuries restated in the wildest and most unreal terms was eagerly expectant of such a fantastic Messiah. The common people, unsophisticated, had the simple longing for some readjustment which would bring them release from their utter subjection, politically and economically, which made life a torture. They had all kinds of crude notions about who, and what such a releasing hero, Messiah, should be. They even thought the rude-looking John the Baptist from the wilderness could be he. But however crude, a popular belief in a suddenly appearing national deliverer who would do marvelous things and bring them sweet release, prevailed among the populace. The learned men, the Scribes and Pharisees, had worked out a minute system of Messianic dogmatics, and theology purporting to tell just when the time would arrive and what sort of being the Messiah should be and what particular deeds he would perform.

Thus we see that the Messianic idea among the Hebrew people was not a fixed, definitely defined concept, but differed at different periods of their history and among different classes of the same period. It passed through and meant all shades of belief, from a temporal victorious king who should unite Israel and make it supreme, like David, to a supernatural, unearthly mysterious being manufactured by and colored with the wildest imaginations of the apocalyptic writers after the exile, all of which was arranged into an ecclesiastical system. These facts must be clearly recognized before any satisfactory consideration of Jesus' own Messianic consciousness can be approached.

Through all these apparent variations runs one unifying

idea. It is that of the kingdom. It is the kingdom, whether as at first purely political and national, or as afterwards more spiritual and exalted, and sometimes unearthly that is the occasion for and gives the form to the hero who is to establish it. The Messiah was expected to be instrumental in bringing the kingdom, but the desire of the kingdom actually generated the Messianic hero idea. We get to the Messianic idea through a study of the kingdom, rather than to the kingdom through a study of the Messiah. The idea of the kingdom of God was not originated by Jesus any more than the idea of the Messiah was. It too meant everything from national supremacy and personal ease to the reign of righteousness and justice. But it always and at all times involved and meant a change of fortune for the better for Israel. A kingdom message that did not promise this, and any one whatever else he did or did not do, that would not do this or attempt to do it would be utterly denied the Messianic title.

Just as among all primitive people, the nature of their particular hardships and dangers formed the occasion of their immediate wants and thus created and colored the form of the saviour hero who should protect and provide for them, so among the Hebrew people, the national and social stress formed the occasion for their particular kingdom wish, and through it the kind of a hero, who would surely bring this wish true. The Messiah personally was only an object of admiration perhaps and expectation because of the advantageous and happy results they desired and expected him to bring. Largely on the basis of what they felt to be the summum bonum—their chief good—was their Messianic idea erected. It reflected always their life attitude. Just as the doctrine of the fall has determined for centuries the ideas of theology about Jesus, and he is made to fit into a previous scheme rather than make the scheme fit him, so the previous idea of the kingdom determined the measure and kind of a Messiah.

Just as the grade of a man's intellectual and spiritual life, the attitude of his soul decides whether he wants to get some-

where or become something, whether he wants to enter pearly gates or have a pearly conscience, walk golden streets or have a golden soul, and through this indicates the kind of a Saviour he wants, so their idea of their supreme good, whether ease or righteousness or both, determined their concept of the Messiah. It was the various kingdom ideas that bred and reared and shaped the various Messianic concepts. It was Jesus' kingdom ideas that helped to shape his Messianic idea.

### III. JESUS' IDEA.

Every man, especially every man of sufficient ability to be a leader of men, is a product of two sets of forces. One is the original power and particular genius of his own nature, his own soul structure. The other set is the political, social atmosphere in which he lives, combined with the spiritual possessions of the nation or race to which he belongs. He is both an effect and a cause.

To think of Jesus as a sort of meteor dropped into the material world with no vital relation to it, living in sublime isolation with a series of mysterious ideas given him in a previous realm is to do violence to him and to his cause. On the other hand, to think that he of all men was the least original, that he was a mere product of outside forces; that by adding the column of things and ideas that surrounded him the result would be Jesus, is to do him and the whole nature of man an unpardonable violence. Jesus and all men are a fresh flame from the central fire. The world of things and thoughts may furnish the fuel, which will affect but can not create or ultimately determine the force and fury of that flame. Jesus' Messianic idea therefore is not purely an original product thrust upon the world, nor a mere repetition of his inheritance. It is a continuation of both. He got his Messianic idea, whether as at first as being some objective person other than himself, or as later as himself the Messiah, from his personal relation with the kingdom.

Jesus believed implicitly in the great national religious

hope—the coming of the kingdom. His first message was an almost exact repetition of John the Baptist—"The kingdom is at hand." His gospel is the glad news of the kingdom. Notwithstanding many minor passages, we feel warranted in saying that Jesus looked upon the kingdom both as a future fact, and as a sudden rather than a gradual process. Had he abandoned the idea of futurity there would have been no basis for his preaching, for surely neither the present nor the past indicated the reign of righteousness. He had no desire to believe anything else. In this he was in harmony with the apocalyptic writers. He likewise felt that the advent of the future coming kingdom would be a sudden expression of God accompanied by marvelous demonstrations of divine power. It would be an immediate act of God bursting in upon the present world. John believed and preached this too. To John the advent would be largely destructive, but to Jesus constructive.

It is easy to read our own ideas back into any past period. It is easy to make Jesus preach the coming of the kingdom as a gradual moral transformation of society through all the ramified life interests. But who can think of the people of his day or the first century in the midst of the most desperate conditions giving any credence to a gospel of slow transformation. All of the apocalyptic sayings which are assigned to him, and those in the book of revelation, and the belief in the speedy return or second coming in Paul's writings, indicate their belief in a sudden future event. Because we find it necessary to have a different idea is not said that Jesus had our idea, and in order to get the support of his spirit for our age we are not compelled to deny that he preached in the apocalyptic categories of the kingdom and the Messiah of his age.

They conceived and expressed their assurance of God's presence and God's sovereignty in terms of apocalypse, we in terms of evolution. We may need a new apocalypse, for the past seems to prove its necessity. It is questionable indeed

if the Hebrew or early or even later Christianity could have achieved or kept alive its great spirit without the apocalyptic framework.

But though Jesus did have the idea of the kingdom as a future event suddenly appearing, he differed decidedly from the traditional in his interpretation of the kingdom due to his different concept of God. It was his God concept that affected his interpretation of the kingdom and therefore of the Messiah. If the expected kingdom was to be God's kingdom, then its nature depended upon the nature of God. It is precisely here that we find Jesus' originality and his point of departure. His gospel was not only the glad news of the kingdom, but the glad news of such a kingdom as his father God would establish.

A comparison of his teachings, his parables (*e. g.*, the one popularly called "The Prodigal Son," but which in reality is "The Parable of the Suffering Father") and his life with the conventional prescriptions of the priests of his day reveals not only a fundamental change but a grand elevation in the concept of God. His God would have a kingdom come and a Messiah to aid in it, but it would only be such a kingdom and such a Messiah as such a God would have.

While we are justified in saying that the source of Jesus' Messianic idea was his immediate experience of God, that immediate experience was not externally given but derived from his struggle for primary values of life. "What life teaches, God teaches," and it was his wholesome relation to the normal needs of men in their human affairs that both furnished and served to express his superior God consciousness, kingdom and Messianic ideas. As Höfding says, "A man draws his circle of ideas from his practical relations in the struggle for the primary values of life and his religious experiences find expression in these without the formation of entirely new ideas which would probably be an impossibility." His God was righteous, but the righteousness of such a God meant right human relations, and simple human affairs were sacred and

the holy concern of God. God was to him not a remote detached sovereign, but an interested brooding parent. His kingdom would be the sway of holiness in human relations, and not of sheer omnipotence in behalf of any race or people. His Messiah would be one that would be most useful in making all human relations wholesome and good, rather than one who would dazzle with supposed heavenly splendor and dominate in royal fashion. He would have to be such a Messiah because God was a God with just such a character and purpose.

Out of the plain honest grapple of his soul with the plain human facts of life, in a desperate struggle for the primary values his soul saw and embodied an ideal achieving spirit, saw and embodied God, which was the foundation not only of a new conception of the kingdom and of Messiah, but of a new kingdom and a new Messiah.

Here too is the basis of the almost constant controversies and misunderstandings between him and the Pharisees. Jesus was not the victim of wicked men, but of blind and bigoted minds. As he said, "They could not see." They had sought to do the law, rather than the human truth. Their God was a high priest interested in the temple and ritual requirements. His God was a father interested in his children, and their human needs. Differing thus fundamentally, we are not surprised at the frequent debates and conflicts, and their culmination in his death.

With such a God and such a kingdom as the Pharisees had in mind, they would naturally expect a Messiah, as a Davidic king or a spectacular personage doing marvelous things. With such a God, and such a kingdom as Jesus had in his mind and heart we would naturally expect such a Messiah as he was.

To them the kingdom would be chiefly national and political, with headquarters at Jerusalem, and the Messiah would be a national character and a nation subduer. To Jesus the kingdom would be more universal, largely ethical rather than political, and the Messiah would be a world redeemer and not a conqueror.

To them he must come panoplied with power and continually manifesting his supernaturalness in behalf of their release. To Jesus he should be like unto his brethren. He could grow weary and be surprised, anxious and exposed to the common lot of men. His idea was hence so different as to expose himself to their reproach. They thought it blasphemy for him to identify himself with this majestic figure. Of course they could not see in him their Messiah, for there was so little in him that in any way conformed either to their prophetic teaching or doctrinal speculations. Jesus was not the Jewish Messiah in the sense of fulfilling their Messianic scheme or schedule. They were right from their standpoint in refusing him. When we try to make Jesus an extet fulfilment of Old Testament prophecy or of Pharisaic dogmatics, we go into the face of facts. We try to assert what he actually was not, and what he never tried to be. The great trouble with the Jewish Messianic hope in the form which it assumed, is not that it is yet to be realized, but *can never be realized*. It is an impossible and preposterous expectation. *Their Messiah will never come.*

It is sometimes asked, why did Jesus dare to assume the Messianic title if he knew he could not meet the expectations that the name aroused? How could he expect them to believe in his Messiahship when it was so radically different?

He did not arrogate to himself the sacred title. Like every man in every age he had to use the categories of thought in use. We use the word government or Bible or God, even though we know by their use we have a different set of ideas from those who believe in a monarchy, a divine dictation or an avenger. Words, like men, have to be born again. Jesus made the word Messiah fit him rather than himself to fit it. He exploded and recreated the word. By doing God's will in the struggle for the primal values he was not, like the Pharisees, seeking to so punctiliously obey regulations as to induce God to reward their righteousness with the coming kingdom, but he was expressing already the kingdom morality. It was not an ethic to please God, but God's ethic. His habit was the

kingdom habit of action. It was not what must I do to be saved in the kingdom, but what will a kingdom man do. John the Baptist had revived a fading hope in the coming of the kingdom. Jesus accepted this hope, but he found he was not only a more hopeful herald, but a helper. The kingdom was not only immanent, ready to come in, but it was being expressed in anticipation by Jesus. Because he thus knew he was doing God's will, because he knew his morality was kingdom morality, he knew he was bringing the kingdom and was thus the Messiah. He fulfilled the title by filling it full of new meaning, and asserted his own right to act as judge upon what it should mean and in the kingdom he was bringing. He did not arrogate to himself a glorious title, but glorified with his own glory a word that expressed in spite of itself a truth too good to let perish.

We of this present age can learn here from Jesus in our modern struggle. Sometimes words and phrases in current use no longer express our religious convictions. Sometimes institutions seem to be hindrances rather than helps. What right have we to use these words or be related to these institutions? They, after all, express an abiding truth and can serve perhaps as the best medium for the new spirit we wish to infuse. Was Jesus' message in his day; can any message in any day be independent of the framework of that age? A man should not move out of the church because its doctrinal statements no longer express his convictions. The church may do with him what the Jews did to Jesus, but he has the privilege of giving old words a new meaning, and still retain those words that their spirit may still move among men. Religious phrases and institutions have a proneness to become detached from life and grow sterile. They must be redeemed and reunited vitally with life. This was part of Jesus' task, and it is ours.

However much the somewhat minute predictions of Jesus' death may reveal the viewpoint of writers after that event transpired, and however much he may have in his early life

expected a somewhat general and enthusiastic acceptance of his gospel and himself, it seems entirely evident that he soon saw that his people would not follow him, but he would arouse such opposition as would possibly lead to the worst. The cross not in clear outline but as a shadowy but awful possibility seemed to be always near him. He lived his life under it. Not long, if at all, did he expect his people to accept in any wholesale fashion his idea of the kingdom and himself as their Messiah. He was surprised when even a few seemed to catch the idea. He seemed to pity those who could not. He did not die of a heart broken by disappointment.

The Messiah of Jesus seemed such a dwarfed, puny, helpless thing in comparison with the majestic splendor of the traditional apocalyptic belief. His associates, his manner of living, made him almost ridiculous in the eyes of the authorities. They had no place for such facts in their idea. The only way it was at all tolerable even to the disciples was on the supposition that he was always on the verge of casting off this helplessness, this reserve, this weakness and at the next turn of the way would manifest marvelous power. They could not see anything Messianic! They could only hope he would be. But even if on one occasion one of them did seem to see a little clearer he soon spoiled the whole impression and showed how the old idea still clung by positively objecting to Jesus' statements about going to Jerusalem and meeting face to face the issue and its consequences. For a suffering Messiah they had absolutely no room. A dying Messiah was a ludicrous thought indicating a sort of insanity. It was a stumbling block to all the more thoughtful Jews, including Paul, to whom it was a terrible blasphemy, and his conversion was not so much ethico-religious as theological, from the doctrine of a non-suffering to a suffering Messiah. But in Jesus' idea it was the most natural element.

He started with a struggle for the primary values of life, against entrenched social and ecclesiastical tyranny. He felt the lot of common toil. He knew the power of monopoly in

the fish market. He once went with the family to the temple and saw his pet lamb killed as a sacrifice to God, and it made him feel the awful robbery of the poor and the travesty of such a belief that God wanted or delighted in such things. He got his gospel out of the heart of a great struggle. He praised the widow's mite, for he knew what that small coin meant in his own experience, and then he proceeded to demolish the whole system that exacted that coin in the name of God. Out of such experiences he would gather to himself the words of religion that would help him and his soul, and it was here that he must have clasped to his heart that beautiful and sublime passage in Isaiah in which in human terms and in a typically humanly good character, the expiatory value of the suffering of such a character, whether it be nation, remnant or individual, is expressed. He knew he had this character. He knew after awhile that he was expiating, removing sin by putting a new life in the wrongdoer through fellowship. He knew he was thus living God's life and the kingdom way, and therefore he was Messiah not in spite of but by very reason of his suffering. If to them suffering and Messiah were utterly incompatible terms, to Jesus they, out of actual experience, were utterly inseparable. Out of experience he knew the kingdom of good will comes only by good will suffering in behalf of ill will in seeking to make it good. He was not assured of his suffering through his Messiahship, but of his Messiahship through his suffering.

The death of Jesus, which to others meant the failure of a foolish movement and an unanswerable argument to all claims of Messiahship, was to him, though not always in clear terms, but in death-like grapple in the dark, the evidence of Messiahship. His death was certainly occasioned by his fundamental ideas and loyalty to them. But while he died heroically and will always be the hero's hero, yet he faced it with a sense that what he had been potentially, during life, by his death he would now become actually. His death would be his inauguration day when he would be actually what he had been ten-

tatively or potentially. It was not only the pathway of duty, but the pathway to power, and saviourhood.

As Jesus' kingdom idea was present in so far as it was evidenced by his deeds, and thus so near as to be already felt, yet was chiefly future, for he prayed "Thy Kingdom Come" not thy kingdom keep on coming, so his Messianic idea was a present reality only in so far as he was manifesting the kingdom kind of life and bringing the kingdom spirit in, but was chiefly a future fact yet to be gained.

Professor E. F. Scott in his book, "The Kingdom and the Messiah," says that Jesus believed his death would "(1) bring about the great transition, (2) break down the limitations about him, (3) mark the commencement of the final drama in which the Messiah will bear the central part. He believed his death was his baptism to the Messianic office, and a decisive episode in the Messianic period."

If this expresses Jesus' view of his death in this particular, it indicates that, notwithstanding his radical departure from his contemporaries, he still was much under the influence of the old apocalyptic notion. While his idea of the kingdom and the Messiah was different, yet its operation, though deferred till after his death, was to be somewhat after the old national type, for nowhere do we have any trace of how his investiture with complete Messianic powers was to take place or to be expressed other than in apocalyptic terms.

Just what Jesus' own idea at this point was there seems to be no way of accurately telling. It is doubtful if it was as distinctively apocalyptic as is often supposed.

However, his disciples and the first preachers were saturated with the old Jewish Messianic idea. They never got far away from it. Peter's preaching was not an exposition of the spirit of the sermon on the mount or of the good samaritan, but an effort to prove that Jesus was the Jewish Messiah. The writers of the New Testament quote passages from the Old Testament entirely out of their context and give them a meaning they were never intended to have in order to prove their

case (*e. g.*, I will call my son out of Egypt, was used as a prediction of Jesus' escape from Herod when in the Old Testament it meant no such prediction whatever). We may deplore and feel a stupendous loss in this departure from preaching Jesus' faith to faith in Jesus as Messiah, from spirit to apologetics, but it was done and perhaps was necessary. Just as it is difficult for us to see how Jesus could have looked upon his death other than as a miserable defeat except in the cosmic terms of the Messianic system, so it is difficult to see how the new movement could have survived or have been more than a local sect had it not been taken up in the categories of the old Messianism. This was not only the swaddling clothes, but the mighty body which stood before the Jew and went before Greece and Rome in supernal splendor.

The whole series of beliefs about the second coming of Jesus, with which St. Paul was saturated, is but a rebaptizing of the old Jewish Messianism with a Christian name. They drew the equation, which was not true except in the most modified form, that Jesus is the Jewish Messiah and at once fitted him into the elaborate system. As the doctrine of the Old Testament prophets of a mighty king establishing his kingdom at Jerusalem kept the flame of hope burning through the long nights of despair, though it was an illusion and never came true; so the newer form of the same doctrine, the second coming of Jesus kept the hearts of the first Christians brave in the midst of those desperate days, though it too was largely a brain fabric. Is our so-called undoubted Christian faith any nearer reality? Might not much of it be our doubtful Christian knowledge? How much of it is symbol and how much real? Has the spirit been lost or choked to death? But who would not rather meet God even in a dream than not to meet him at all.

The doctrine of Messianic hope, both in Jewish and Christian form, was not an unmixed good. Its false expectations made sceptics and produced the mistaken convictions that killed Jesus. The second coming doctrine created an end

*ethics, a little communistic scheme that failed and furnished the occasion for hard-headed men like Ananias to lie. It has helped to keep religion an unearthly and other-worldly affair with blessings to be externally secured by miraculous and supernatural activities. It has supported ecclesiastical domination and religious isolation. It has obscured Jesus, and made one of the religious burdens of the ages to be the rescue of Christ from Christianity. Those marvelous pictures in the book of Revelation of a bloody arch power trampling over foes and reveling in carnage are a vivid restatement of Jewish Messianism, but a miserable misunderstanding of Jesus which has helped to color the Christian horizon blood red down the centuries. Did Jesus ever think of himself thus? He took the title Messiah not as a mere matter of accommodation, but from necessity, but he broke its traditional bounds and made the title fit him. His idea was primarily ethical rather than political, universal not exclusively national, redemptive not restorative, saving from wrong not protecting from foes, manifesting God in human service, not in lording it over them, bringing men to God not to Jerusalem.*

That for which mankind longs, that which Israel tried to express even though in national and fantastic terms, that which we seek to express in our Christologies may not be true to the actual Christ, may indeed be untrue but as we know Jesus the Messiah was, though different, yet greater and grander than the Jewish Messiah, so we believe Jesus the Christ is greater and grander than any Christology yet written or conceived.

CARLISLE, PA.

## II.

### THE AIM OF THE SERMON.

ROBERT F. REED.

The sermon's place in the church service is secure and permanent. It would be just as easy to think of such a service with prayer left out as to think of it with no sermon. Of course prayer has a fixed place in the normal service in the sanctuary. But the sermon has come to be no less an essential element of worship in the Lord's house.

But then there are sermons and sermons. They are not all of equal value. Some are good. You feel it. You are certain that they have been a blessing and will continue to be of help to you in the days and weeks to come. They give tone and color to the whole of life. They contain spiritual pabulum. The worshipper comes away from the church where he heard them resolved to lead a different life. He recognizes a value in his fellowman such as before he failed to appreciate. He has a new vision. Literally, he sees matters in a new light. Life now, whatever may have been the case formerly, is really worth while. Both God and men have come closer to him. Of other sermons the most charitable thing to be thought or said is that they are of no real value. People leave church as they went. Not altogether, either. They are just a little dissatisfied with themselves for having spent an hour in a place where they got nothing in return, at least nothing from the sermon in the way of helpfulness.

A minister need not be in the work very long before he comes to know that his sermons are not alike in value. At one time he preaches well: a really helpful sermon. He somehow knows that his message means something to men. The truth he proclaims is vital. He is aware of the fact that it lays hold

of men's hearts and consciences. He feels certain that it does them good. Neither is he mistaken in his view of the matter. On another occasion, for no very clear reason, he preaches, just preaches. The message does not grip men. It seems to have no effect upon them. The sermon appears to be nothing more than so many words, perhaps never so well arranged. But from all appearances it accomplishes very little.

Why this difference? What makes the one sermon good and helpful and the other not? What element in the sermon differentiates one from another? And it matters little whether the two sermons come from two different ministers or whether they come from the same minister on two different occasions.

Certainly the difference is not a question of entertainment. The sermon is not supposed to be and need not be entertaining in the same manner in which, for example, a lecture or recital of some kind or a play, is entertaining. The church of Christ is not in competition with the nicklette. True, some people come to the house of God to be amused. They institute a comparison between the sermon they hear on Sunday and the humorous lecture they attend occasionally during the week. But such people err. Indeed they are not properly qualified to judge a sermon. And the fact that after a time they no longer come to church service is more of a reflection on their own spiritual life than on the ability or talent of the preacher who earnestly tries to discharge the duties that devolve upon him as the Lord's messenger.

Nor again is the difference due primarily to the fact that the one sermon is educational and the other not. The work of educating people belongs mainly to the various schools: week day schools of all descriptions and the Sunday school. True, the sermon usually has an educational factor in it. There is hardly a sermon preached that does not contain at least a little something pertaining to the life of the people of God, either of God in his relation to men, or of men in their relation to one another, that comes as helpful news to some people in the congregation. But granting this, it is nevertheless a fact that we

hear many a sermon that contains nothing in the way of information, nothing new, for us, and yet it proves very helpful. Therefore we conclude that the educational element in the sermon is not the one of first importance.

However let me not be misunderstood. While neither the element of entertainment nor that of education is of the very first significance in relation to the sermon it does not follow by any means that either of them ought to be wholly excluded. A sermon may in some ways be both entertaining and instructive. The worshipper may be very much interested in the sermon and may learn not a little from it. But he certainly does not come to church chiefly to be amused or instructed. He seeks something else. Why then does he come? What is that additional element that makes the sermon helpful?

Let us look at the genesis of the preaching function. What very likely was the end of the first sermon ever preached? What was the aim of the first preacher? What did he want to bring about? Was it not a change of heart or mind on the part of his hearer or hearers? No doubt he wanted men to feel that they no longer ought to do certain things; or perhaps that they ought immediately do certain other things. Furthermore he was very much concerned that men should be made to realize that they would be able, if only they were to make the attempt, to strike out along the path he then pointed out to them. He was anxious to have the people whom he addressed view life together with all its interests after the manner in which it becomes the privilege of the people of God to look upon these matters. His desire was to supply them with spiritual food; place it before them; tell them where to obtain it, or lead them to the place where they could find it for themselves. Whether it was Noah or not, the first preacher and every one since, true to his calling, was bent upon giving men the conviction that conduct unbecoming to them as men ought to be done away with, and on the other hand, that the affairs of life that always are to man's credit ought to be magnified by them. In other words, the preacher of all ages tries to

bring about a quickening effect upon the hearer. The sermon ought to be stimulating, edifying, inspirational. The end of the sermon, therefore, is neither entertainment, nor is it education, but it is edification.

To bring this about it is not enough that the sermon be preached. If there is any desire on the part of the preacher to produce results in relation to his hearers it is of course essential that he reach them. The gospel must be made to appeal to men and women. It must find them. It needs to be modern and adapted to all classes of people, young and old, cultured and not cultured. The sermon must have what Ian Maclaren terms the canon of humanity.

While the people that from time to time appear before the minister as he arises in the pulpit to proclaim the word of God represent all stages of religious growth, bear very many different attitudes to God and the eternal verities, some of them dwelling at home while others are sojourning in the far country and still others are loitering along the way at almost all points between the far country and the father's house, nevertheless, the sermon is intended, broadly speaking, for two classes of people. Every congregation is composed of either saints or sinners. As a rule of both, in various proportions. The men and women who listen to the sermon are, on the one hand, either penitent sinners, persevering Christians, coming saints; or, on the other hand, they are reckless transgressors, impenitent evil doers, proud sinners. The worshipper is either penitent or impenitent. At one time when at church he may be penitent, at another, not. No doubt in every assembled congregation, the saints are in the majority. For the impenitent sinner does not habitually seek the house of God. The atmosphere of the sanctuary is not to his liking. Of course, religion is of great value. Even men of the world recognize this fact. And, therefore, now and then, there are those who pretend to have it who yet are utter strangers to the genuine article. Hence not all who seem to worship are sincere, and their presence at the service in the temple does not

necessarily indicate that they really seek help from God. There are modern hypocrites. To be sure, we have this product, as so many others, in an up-to-date form. But no matter, after all, what is the proportion of sinners to saints, we may be certain that the two classes are represented in practically every congregation.

Since this is the case, it is self-evident that both classes are to be reached and helped by the sermon. Both of them need to be kept in mind by the minister in the preparation and the preaching of the sermon. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that every sermon should be directed to both sinner and saint. It may be expedient at times to have in mind the one class almost exclusively. For the sermon that is adapted to the sinner is not very likely to be of great help to the saint. Nor again is the sermon that is of help to the saint very often likely to be of equal help to the sinner. But, after all, it is very important for the conscientious servant of the Lord who would minister efficiently unto both classes to remember that neither the one nor the other may safely be overlooked, or neglected, for any long period of time.

The sinner ought to be told in one form or another that he need not remain a sinner; that he is capable of a life of a much higher order than that in which sin predominates; that there is forgiveness for him; that what he needs to do is to come to himself and make up his mind to return to his father's house, for there his sins will no longer be remembered against him; that God, his loving Father, is ready, and longs to share with him the blessings of the kingdom. This is what we designate as the positive side of the gospel for the sinner. This positive element was very marked in the case of our Saviour's work.

The negative side comes to view in the warning that needs to be sounded at least occasionally. If men refuse to repent in spite of all the gracious invitations that are extended unto them in the name of their Father, who is not willing that any should perish, but who desires all to come to a knowledge of salvation as it is in Jesus Christ, then there is nothing left

for the minister of the same God and Father to do but to tell them of the end of such a career: to remind them of the fact that it is dangerous to remain impenitent sinners. For God is not only a merciful God but He is also a just God. And He cannot, even He cannot, save men against their own wills. The father could not keep the son at home contrary to his will, nor get him to return until he came to himself and decided to come home. And, therefore, it certainly becomes the duty of the Lord's Messenger to sound a note of warning, so that men may not ignorantly waste their time upon the things that have as their issue death. Of course, it is well to remember that it may not be open wickedness so much as spiritual indifference that keeps men fettered to a life of sin. But even though it is nothing but indifference, after all, it is the business of the minister of the gospel to rouse men who have become careless: for there is danger that such indifference may become callous. And, if they fail to respond to the positive appeal of the gospel, then certainly he, too, like his Master, ought to remind them of the disastrous consequences of their choice.

On the other hand, the treatment the saint, the growing child of God, calls for is very different. He, too, still has very much to do with sin. That is, sin is still a very real factor of his life. But there is this difference. He is not in accord with the powers of sin. He is genuinely sorry that sin has such a hold on him. He recognizes it as an evil to be conquered. He seeks to overcome it more and more and looks for help that will enable him to be more than conqueror. In short, he looks upon himself as one who has as yet not attained the goal of his life, but also as one who is constantly striving to gain the mastery and feels that, little by little, if he perseveres, with the help of God he will ultimately succeed. What such a one needs is illumination and encouragement: the saint's assurance that heaven's approval rests upon him and his efforts. One who is thus minded ought to be sent away from the house of God with the conviction that, if he keeps on, by

the grace of God he cannot fail. In some way, he must be made to feel that while the forces that are arrayed against him are many and subtle, after all, the powers that are at his command are far superior to those opposed to him, and that, therefore, in the end, the victory will be his. And the sermon fails, so far as this class of people is concerned, if it does not provide help for them. It must present unto them a way of life better than that of faltering which opens unto all who are earnest and sincere seekers after God. It must send them forth with their hearts filled with a hope and courage that will issue in a more Christ-like life.

And I am confident that our sermons should have this note of helpfulness more frequently than any other. The people who, as a rule, come to the house of God are in earnest and sincerely try to live aright and, therefore, they are in need of spiritual enlightenment or encouragement, generally, of both, and it is the privilege of the minister of the word, in some way, to be of help to them in their effort to be and do better.

It goes without saying that the sermon should be so related to the people who hear it that it will not only touch, but move, as well, their hearts and consciences. It ought to apply to them: be of value to them in relation to their own peculiar needs. It must be practical, even concrete rather than abstract, modern, dealing with facts that grip the heart and mind. Yet it is not the aim of the sermon to point out every sin that is brought to the attention of the preacher. The minister of the word manifests decidedly poor taste, and gives evidence of no tact at all, if he makes a public example of some one among his hearers of whose sinful acts he happens to have knowledge, or, at least, supposed knowledge. The sermon ought not afford occasion to any one to detect a personal attack. It is true that the prophet of the Old Testament appeared before the King and said: "Thou art the man." But it is well to recall in this connection that the accusation was made not from the pulpit but at a private interview. And it may become the exceedingly unpleasant duty of the man of

God, in private, to admonish some one of his flock now and then. But, certainly, nothing will be gained by singling out any one in the congregation and going rough-shod over him: "giving it to him," as they say.

So far as the sinner, the indifferent, reckless child of God, is concerned the sermon ought to point out clearly the exceeding sinfulness of sin; leave no doubt in his mind of the fact that God is wronged by him; declare so unmistakably the dire consequences of sin as to convince even the most hardened among sinners that it is wholly unprofitable to dabble in sin. The sermon ought to do this so earnestly, with so much reason, so persuasively, that all impenitent sinners may at least know that it does not pay to sin, and if at all possible, that they may be made to feel very uncomfortable under the preaching as they come to make the application, as they must, to their own particular sin whatever it may be. It ought to result in the conviction that wrong is wrong at all times and everywhere. It must create a desire within men to fight sin as their worst enemy; beget in their hearts a genuine hatred for iniquity. And when this course is followed no needless offense is given in that no one is made a public example. Yet no matter what specific sin on the part of any one may need attention, whether open or secret, the cure for it is at hand, inasmuch as every one will feel as though the sermon was addressed to him, as in a very real sense, it also was. According to Jowett, "our messages must be related to life, to lives, and we must make everybody feels that our key fits the lock of his own private door."

And the same sermonic principle obtains in relation to those who are earnestly trying to do their part as God's people. It is not good taste, neither is it very helpful, to single out any one individual in the congregation, to direct one's remarks to any one person so bluntly, that the fact is observed by the congregation generally. Perhaps there may be one here or there in the congregation whom the minister desires very much to reach in a word of comfort, approval, or encouragement. Very

seldom do we as ministers address an assembly of men and women among whom, for example, there are not at least a few whose hearts long for comfort. We recall in this relation the declaration of Ian Maclaren, made toward the close of his life, that if he were to begin his ministry again, he would, among other things, preach a more comforting gospel. The preacher may know of some one here or there in the congregation who is putting up a brave fight in the battle against sin. The victory is as yet not his. The minister feels confident that he will win out in the end. He longs to help him in his conquest for the right. He ought to. He desires to speak a word of encouragement. He wants to give him his approval. He wants him to know that he has God's approval. But if he fails to exercise judgment, he will do more harm than good, and in his very effort to be of help to him he simply makes it still more difficult for him to carry off the victory.

Let the sermon present God, as revealed in the life and character of Jesus Christ, so lovingly, so sympathetically, and as One so deeply interested in his children at all times, and especially so, when in need of his help, that every one hearing the message of his servant will at once know God as bearing this helpful relation to him personally, and therefore, will leave the service, either penitent, or else comforted, encouraged or enlightened, as he may have need of the one or the other.

I do not want to be understood as claiming that the sermon ought to deal in generalities, even though they be glittering ones. Impersonal platitudes, dull commonplaces, wherever else they may be of value, do not enhance the utility of the practical sermon. Yet the sermon certainly ought to be built upon principles, personal principles resting upon and growing out of the life of Christ, our Saviour, in their relation to the facts of the lives of ordinary men, as they are, and more especially as they ought to be. The sermon that is really helpful must be prepared with a view of the needs of a definite congregation in mind, and, therefore, it cannot as a rule be preached to another people until it has at least to some extent been modified

and adapted to the peculiar needs of that other people. The sermon does not view life upon so broad a basis as to volatilize, or thin out its message into meaningless, wearisome generalizations. But it has in mind that portion of life represented in the congregation to whom it is addressed, and presents principles of conduct that may be put into practice by the people immediately concerned. "The sermon must be a proclamation of truth as vitally related to living men and women." A reference to the sermons of the great preachers of the world of all ages illustrates this fact. They fall back on deep, first principles. When we look at the gospel of our Lord, we see, as we naturally would anticipate, that his utterances, too, rest on the solid rock of life principles. "The Master's teaching is neither ancient nor modern, neither deductive nor inductive, neither Jewish nor Greek. It is universal, enduring, valid for all minds and for all times." Yet it is not impersonal. It has the personal touch. He even protested on one occasion when he was asked to go beyond the proclamation of broad, basic principles. A certain man, who could not agree with his brother as to his part of the family inheritance, came to Jesus and asked him to speak to his brother to the end that he divide the inheritance with him. But Jesus said unto him, "Man, who made me a judge or a divider among you?" and forthwith proceeded to give him a talk on the greed of covetousness. That is, the Saviour knew well enough that if he could get the man before him to see the sin of covetousness, so far as he was concerned, the matter of dividing the inheritance between him and his brother would be rightly attended to. It is not the business of the minister to tell his people in so many words how they are to adjust the affairs of their family life; nor how they are to regulate the doings of their social life; nor, again, how they are to conduct their business matters. Certainly it is his duty to hold out principles of action as exemplified more especially in the person of our Saviour in relation to all the avenues of life that they may be called upon to take; principles that they may make use of and that will be of help to them at

all times, whether at home, in society, or in the business world. It is his privilege to enlighten them to such an extent with the light of the gospel, present the eternal truths of the gospel of the Christ in their application to the children of God so clearly, that they must see their beauty and value as bearing upon their daily life in such a manner that they feel encouraged immediately to go forth and seek to put them into practice. It may become the duty of the members of a congregation as individuals, or united into a group of some kind, occasionally to array themselves against some definite form of evil at large in the community. The minister of God interested in the highest welfare of mankind may not have occasion to frown upon the present-day tendency toward what is known as social service. He may approve of it and even assist in launching the movement. But after all his primary duty is to preach the gospel as effectively as he knows how, and then let the truth of God work itself out in a practical way, first among his people, and afterwards, through them, in society, generally. After the sermon has done its part, the holy spirit with the aid of the quickened conscience may safely be relied upon to do the rest. Therefore, it does not necessarily follow that since the preacher does not mention by name this or that evil rampant in the community that he is indifferent in regard to a matter that others, who are in the fight against it, claim ought to have his attention. After he has made clear to his people the gospel of God in its vital relation to them, they must of their own accord go after this or that special form of wickedness. The sermon ought to help men know the right: be instrumental in creating a passion for righteousness. But, as a rule, the people must then be left to themselves so far as the specific application is concerned. The sermon is not the machinery that under the guiding hand of the skillful operator turns out the finished product, but it is rather the power that drives the machine, and others as well, and thus enables the mechanic to produce the article ready for the market.

It is the aim of the sermon to help in the making of men

and women after God's own eternal plan—men and women of Christian character who are resolved to do only what is becoming to the children of God—then let them use their own judgment as to whether it is to be this special work as over against that, or that as over against this. It is the aim of the sermon to help make Christians and then let those Christians decide for themselves whether they want to be Christians in this place or in that place, doing this or doing that. "Christianity is a spirit—it is a set of principles, and not a set of rules."

Let me illustrate my contention. Let us examine the principle I advocate in connection with the grace of giving. It is not so much the end of the sermon, bearing upon this feature of the Christian life, to get men to give of their means to any one object as it is to cultivate the spirit of Christian charity, and then let them select one or more causes from among the many that have a claim upon men. The apportionment has come to have a prominent place in our denominational life. Our work at home and abroad is largely dependent upon the unanimity with which our people enter upon our common task in this connection. We fully believe that the money applied to the apportionment on the part of our congregations is well spent: is employed to carry on God's work in behalf of his children. And it is well if we can get our people to see matters in such a light that they feel themselves under obligations to help raise the apportionment, if they are not able to count it a privilege to do so. As a denomination, we would have a foretaste of Paradise if the entire apportionment were to be paid. But, after all, the aim of the sermon touching upon this matter is much broader than simply to get people to help pay the apportionment. It is certainly to cultivate the grace of Christian liberality. If we can get our people to see their privileges in relation to the unsaved at home and abroad, then we can rest assured that the apportionment will come to be viewed as but a small part of their work along the line of giving. Certainly, after the sermon has been preached setting forth the beauty of sharing one's possessions with others, it may be essential for

a minister of the Reformed Church, with our system of benevolence, to direct his people's attention to the apportionment as a channel, and even an important one, along which they may exercise Christian liberality. But, after all, full grown men should be permitted to use their own enlightened judgment in the matter. I am quite certain that some members of the Reformed Church help pay the apportionment, not because the grace of charity has to that extent been developed in them, but largely because the subject has been presented to them in such a light by their pastor that they help in the work, and give what they give, as a favor to him. Something, to be sure, has been gained when such is the case, but, undoubtedly, men are agreed that the aim of the sermon relating to the specific matter of giving is not primarily to get the apportionment paid, but rather to cultivate the charitable spirit, which then when unfolded will result in the payment of much more than the apportionment—the minimum of our congregational effort in behalf of others.

The object of the sermon, then, as I see it, is to picture God in such a light to both sinner and saint, whether represented in the same person or in two different persons, that men cannot help but be glad to know that He is their heavenly father; God's love, so helpfully, that men's hearts will be won to him; his interest in men, so earnestly, that they must rejoice to know his will for them in order that they may do it; the value of Christ as a safe leader of men, so convincingly, that men will be glad to accept him as their Saviour and follow him as he bids them; the advantages of the kingdom, so clearly, that men will be made to see that they cannot afford to deprive themselves of them; the exalted position of the child of God in relation to his father as a member of the kingdom, so vividly, that no man can well refrain from coming and offering his heart, his life, himself unto God. It is the aim of the sermon to portray the relation that the child of the kingdom bears to his fellowmen in such a true and correct gospel color that men who hear the story simply cannot help but feel mean

so long as they stand related to men in any other light, and hence at least make an honest effort to love their fellowmen; paint the positive life of the Christian in such a strong light that men will not rest contented until they have made an attempt to get rid of all that mars the picture thus sketched; present the eternal principles of the Master, so persuasively, so consistently, that they justify themselves as the basis and standard of the only life worth while. It is the object of the sermon to help men see that appearances do not count very much in the kingdom of God, however much weight they may have at times with men of the world; to make men feel that wrong is wrong no matter by whom it is done, in the home or on the street, at play or at work; to get them to know beyond all doubt that right is right, at all times, under all circumstances, the world over.

The sermon serves its purpose well when the man back of it enters sympathetically into the real life of the members of his congregation; knows of their cares, needs, doubts, and sins; is not unmindful, on the one hand, of the poverty of their faith and love; nor, on the other, does he permit himself to forget the depth of their inmost longing for better things, even though this longing does not always come to a full, conscious expression on their part. Thus he lifts them upon the high plane of the gospel of their Saviour and brings them face to face with God as their never-failing Helper, and, in the end, is able to send them to their various stations in life with renewed hope and fresh courage. This is what he should do for his people. For there can be no question that the sermon is to put heart into men and women, in order that they may be able to cope with the affairs of their everyday life. Like the Master himself, the gospel sermon is come that men might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly.

The sermon is to be of help to men, indirectly: in finding their place in the world; in enabling them to learn what specific work they are to do. The sermon is to be of help to men, directly: in filling them with a strong determination to

take their place, whatever it may be, as God's children; in doing their appointed tasks in a manner becoming to them as members of God's kingdom. Largely, if not primarily, I should say, the sermon is to be quickening, inspirational.

FREEMANSBURG, PA.

### III. TRUTH.<sup>1</sup>

N. C. SCHAEFFER.

If an inhabitant of Mars could visit our planet and listen to the discussions on industrial education, he would be tempted to think that the grand aim and purpose of mundane education might be displayed by putting above the entrance to the school house, in letters of electric light, the word *Money*. We have schoolmen who hold the almighty dollar so close to their eyes that they see nothing else in God's universe. Branches of study like history they propose to exclude from the curriculum of the modern school because they do not see how such studies can help the boy to solve the problem of earning a livelihood. The great Teacher says that man shall not live by bread alone. Instead of placing the word money above the door of the school house I would substitute another word of five letters—*Truth*.

Truth is more than knowledge, although the latter is the more comprehensive term. Knowledge may abide in the mind as a mere matter of intellect and exert little or no influence upon life and conduct. Truth always goes deeper than the intellect. It touches the heart out of which are the issues of life. Hence the best teachers of every age and clime have regarded truth as the pearl of great price which should be sought and valued above everything else. Pythagoras cherished so high an estimate of truth that he said if the Deity should make himself visible to man, he would choose light for his body and truth for his soul. In the book of Proverbs we find this admonition: "Buy the truth and sell it not, yea wisdom, instruction, and understanding."

<sup>1</sup> A commencement address by Dr. N. C. Schaeffer, Superintendent of Public Instruction in Pennsylvania.

Since a proverb is the summing up of the wisdom of the many through the wit of one, it is always helpful to meditate upon the wealth of meaning hidden in proverbs. Does the author of proverbs mean to say that truth can be got in exchange for money? Does he mean to intimate that truth can be inherited as we inherit money? Without doubt the human race is the heir of all the ages in the possession of truth and in its application to the arts and industries. Moreover we often get the benefit of an expert's knowledge of truth by paying for his services. But the expert acquired his mastery of the truth only as the result of painstaking effort and study. And there is no other way by which truth can be acquired and mastered.

The Hebrew unit of value was the shekel. Like our dollar it stood for labor, exertion, effort of some kind by somebody. Money is the measure of the value of the effort which some one has put forth. Many things which are essential to our existence come to us as a free gift, *e. g.*, the light and heat of the sun, the showers of rain from the clouds, and the pure, fresh air that we breathe. Truth does not come to us in that way. A modern commentator interprets the proverb to mean three things:

1. The truth must be bought—it costs.
2. The truth is worth all it costs.
3. Although the truth is worth so much, it is sometimes sold.

Euclid, whose name is synonymous with geometry, was right when he told his royal pupil: "There is no royal road to geometry." Mathematical truth can be grasped and mastered in one way only—that is, by close and laborious thinking. It can never be acquired by memorizing, nor by coaching, nor by loafing. The acquisition and the mastery of all types of truth involve diligent search and investigation.

Did you ever think of the word laboratory as indicative of what is involved in the quest of truth, yea in all scientific research and investigation? Did you ever see in a doctor's

office the picture of Andreas Vesalius, standing beside a dissecting table. Could you help thinking of the persecutions, the exile, the patient labor in hidden and pestilential places which he had to undergo in his career as the founder of the science of anatomy? History is full of the tales of heroic effort and sacrifice which the quest of truth has cost the martyrs of science.

But the truth is worth all it costs. We sometimes say that a man running for office puts himself into the hands of his friends. If you have ever stretched yourself upon the surgeon's table, you have put yourself into the hands of your friends as no politician ever did.

And if after going down to the brink of the grave, the surgeon's knife has brought you back to health and strength, you have realized that the scientific truth discovered by Vesalius and others is worth all it cost. Scientific truth has revolutionized the arts, the industries, the warfare of modern times. Science is transforming the conduct of business, the processes of manufacture, the methods of mining, the activities of commerce, the practice of the professions, the education of children.

At this point we get a glimpse of the difference between the elementary school and the high school, between the high school and the university. In the elementary school we must generally be satisfied if the pupil learns the processes and grasps the *how* without mastering the *why*. In the high school he is expected to penetrate beneath the surface and to discern the relations which are scientific. What is science? Science is the knowledge of things in their causes and essential relations. The high school teacher must get the pupils to pass from cause to effect, from reason to consequence, from law to its application. The university professor must go still further. He must train the mind in the habits of thought which lie at the foundation of scientific research and discovery. It is the function of the university not merely to preserve and transmit truth, but to enlarge the boundaries of science, to promote the

quest of truth for its own sake and to apply it for the uplift of humanity.

But the strangest thing about the truth still remains to be emphasized. Although truth is worth so much, it is sometimes sold. Judas sold his Lord and Master for thirty pieces of silver. In modern times we often sell the truth for less than that. "Where is that ribbon we were selling at five cents a yard," asked the sales-lady of the floor-walker. "Over on the bargain counter, selling at six cents a yard," was the reply. In that department store they were selling the truth at a cent a yard. Sometimes the truth is sold for a vote, for a smile, for a mere monetary advantage. Here we should without doubt draw a distinction for the purpose of enlarging and clarifying our vision. Perhaps the distinction can best be made clear by a story which deeply impressed me in my boyhood. An elderly gentleman told me of two friends who had many things in common but on one point they could not agree. One of them was a great student of nature and nature's laws; but his soul never rose from nature up to nature's God. The other was likewise a great student of nature, but his chief delight was in the truth as it is in Jesus. One Christmas he received a present of a wonderful clock. He showed it to his friend who admired its mechanism, whereupon the Biblical student said: "I have not told you the most wonderful thing about that clock. It came into being by chance. It never had a maker." "You do not expect me to believe such nonsense," said the scientist. "And yet you expect me to believe that this Universe which is far more wonderful than a clock, never had a Maker or Creator," was the reply.

There are two great realms of truth—one the realm of truth as revealed in nature—the other the domain of truth as found in Revelation. A Latin proverb says that all truth is from God. Hence there can be no contradiction in the two types of truth, not in the essence, only in our comprehension of truth. Both types of truth may be sold by neglect. "What is truth,"

exclaimed Pontius Pilate and then turned away in despair without waiting for an answer. The human mind and the human heart often turn away from the source and fountain of truth by reason of pre-posessions and pre-conceived notions. Think of the vagaries of anti-vaccinationists and of the devotees of christian science. At the time of Harvey's death not twenty physicians had accepted his discovery of the circulation of the blood. At the time of Newton's death comparatively few scholars had accepted the theory of gravitation. How many still refuse to accept the truths of the higher criticism or the truths which Darwin brought to light by his patient investigations! However this is not our main trouble to-day. In this age we have almost become the dupes of credulity by reason of the wonderful things which science has achieved. The neglect of truth is not most flagrant in what is known as science but in the domain of ethics and politics. I said at the beginning that truth touches the heart out of which are the issues of life. When truth passes over into speech it becomes veracity or truthfulness. The worst insult you can offer to another, is to call him a member of the Ananias Club. The liar knowingly and willingly violates the virtue of veracity. When truth passes over into life, and conduct, it gives us true men and true women.

This brings us to the secret of success in teaching. Only he who lives the truth, can teach it with masterly effect. The transformation of knowledge into a harvest of new thought, sentiment and purpose becomes possible under the guidance of the teacher only when the truth has touched his heart, filled his soul and permeated his whole mind and life and conduct. The poet has well said:

Thou must thyself be true  
If thou the truth wouldst teach.  
Thy soul must o'erflow if thou  
Another's soul wouldst reach.  
It needs the heart's o'erflow

To give the lips full speech.  
Think truly and thy thought  
Shall the world's famine feed.  
Speak truly and every word  
Shall be a fruitful seed.  
Live truly and thy life  
Shall be a noble creed.

LANCASTER, PA.

#### IV.

### THE NEWER ORTHODOXY.

PAUL B. RUPP.

In the preface to a small monograph<sup>1</sup> published a generation ago, we find this striking contrast: "By orthodoxy I would mean the continuous historical development of the doctrine of Jesus and his apostles; and the orthodox habit and temper of mind I would consider simply to be fidelity to the teachings of the Spirit of Truth throughout Christian history, as the things of Christ have been witnessed to the church in its great confessions, and as the words of the Lord are still opening their meanings under new providential lights, in the enlarging thought of the Christian world. Orthodoxism, on the other hand, is the dogmatic stagnation and ecclesiastical abuse of orthodoxy. Orthodoxism is an orthodoxy which has ceased to grow—a dried and brittle orthodoxy." Unfortunately this distinction has seldom been observed, and the two ideas have been used interchangeably. Orthodoxy is commonly regarded as harmony with the general teaching of the contemporary church, though it is a somewhat difficult matter for even the most orthodox churchmen to give an intelligent account of the precise teaching of the church. We are informed by the old school Romanist<sup>2</sup> that the dogmatic and ecclesiastical systems were originally given *in toto* by Christ to the apostles, and by them to their successors. Moreover, the substance of even the conciliar decrees was proclaimed by the Master. On the other hand we are greeted by the traditional Protestant conception that Christianity in its ideal form is to be found in the scriptures; that it was per-

<sup>1</sup> Smythe, "The Orthodox Theology of To-day," 1881, p. vii.

<sup>2</sup> Hastings, "Ency. of R. and E.," Vol. III, p. 586.

verted by the later Roman church, and that the Reformation was a return to the apostolic type of faith. But the former view, as we shall see, fastens upon Christian teaching a fixed content which psychologically it can not possess; while the latter would confer upon first century Christianity a permanent form which historical investigation will not be willing to grant.<sup>3</sup> Christianity, either as embodying static dogmatic concepts, or as bound unalterably to a primitive form, would be little better than a curious relic, worthy of a place in some museum of religious antiquities.

But Christian doctrine is neither so unchangeable nor so lifeless. There is resident in it an accommodating power which enables it to vindicate itself to the inquiring mind of every generation. We may, with Smythe, regard it as the result of "an historical development of the doctrine of Jesus and his apostles"; or we may, with many of the sects, consider it merely an exerescence upon the primitive apostolic faith; but in either case, its formulation has undergone a distinct course of development during the centuries, while Truth itself has remained the unchanging and underlying reality of all creedal statements.<sup>4</sup> It is only symbols and forms of thought which change, as the powers of the mind and the spiritual intuitions expand through successive generations. Thus one age sees rather clearly what a former merely glimpsed.

Just here we must remember in the first place, that truth is not identical with our statement of it. It was the neglect of this distinction which was responsible for the rise of that "dried and brittle orthodoxy" of which Smythe speaks. Our minds are unable to grasp truth in its absolute sense, for truth is infinite,—and we are not ready as yet to grant infinitude to humans. But therein lies the crux of the whole problem of orthodoxy. The derivation of the term is etymologically clear,—"thinking right" or "straight"—but its practical ap-

<sup>3</sup> Faunce, "The Educational Ideal of the Ministry," 1908, p. 55 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *The Outlook*, March 3, 1915, art. "In Lent."

Smith, "Social Idealism and the Changing Theology," 1913, p. 187.

plication is not so evident. We are all frank to admit that right thinking is fundamental in the Christian faith, but we are not all quite sure what *is* right thinking, nor even what is the Christian faith. For example, in his definition of Christianity<sup>5</sup> A. E. Garvie says it is a religion in which the relation of God and man is mediated by the person and work of Jesus. But by another<sup>6</sup> it is defined simply as "Christ, so far as he has yet become incarnate in humanity." By a third<sup>7</sup> the Christian principle is described as "the intuition of God as Father and of humanity as His children." The social reformer gives a social coloring to his definition, making it little more than a message of hope to the downtrodden and oppressed, and the knell of doom to a false capitalistic system. The philosophical idealist sees in Christianity the end of the process by which the Infinite reveals itself to the finite.<sup>8</sup> Here are five definitions of the same idea, and each has a large measure of truth in it; but not one adequately describes the whole truth which is tied up in the term Christianity. For truth is greater than any definition of it; we lose some of its substance when we attempt to compress it within the necessary limits of word-forms. Thus, "right-thinking," while it aims by a series of logical processes at a clear presentation of that which is obscure, or at co-ordinating various elements into a well-rounded system, is able to arrive at a conclusion which is only an approximation of the truth. This purely partial character of our conclusions, however, does not forbid the act of belief, when all possible evidence has been submitted in the course of the argument.<sup>9</sup> For an approximation is sufficiently near to the truth to convince all open-minded investigators that it is really worthy of acceptance. He who waits for the whole truth be-

<sup>5</sup> Hastings, "E. R. E.," p. 581.

<sup>6</sup> Brown, "Modern Theology and the Preaching of the Gospel," 1914, p. 40.

<sup>7</sup> McComb, "Christianity and the Modern Mind," 1910, p. 97, quoted from Harnack, "What is Christianity."

<sup>8</sup> McComb, *op. cit.*

<sup>9</sup> Moore, "The Rational Basis of Orthodoxy," 1901, Ch. 1.

fore he surrenders to faith will forever remain a skeptic of rather doubtful wisdom.

The second element, then, which is associated with the word orthodoxy is that truth which forms its subject matter is capable of only partial demonstration at any one particular point in time. This applies to each individual investigator. At no time can he assert without fear of contradiction that he has the whole truth of the matter. For he has only that fragment of it which can be seen from his own particular angle. There are other points of vantage from which a slightly different picture can be viewed, where other investigators begin their operations. Each glimpses something which is hidden from the other. In crossing the intervening ground between their viewpoints, the corresponding insight into the truth has changed just enough to be perceptibly variant. We may attribute this variable factor in all independent investigation to psychological difference innate in personality, or to the diverse impact which truth makes upon the mind, or to anything else we please. The fact remains that when each investigator employs all his rational powers in an attempt to penetrate to the very heart of the truth, he fails of just reaching its center, though he does arrive sufficiently near to be convinced of the real trustworthiness of his conclusion. That, however, is not quite so convincing to another. There is a shade of meaning in his interpretation which the other cannot quite balance up with his own. So that while each has investigated the same general proposition, and employed the same logical processes, and been equally honest in his motive, still their conclusions are not quite identical. And which one shall we say is orthodox? Or are they not both orthodox? Have they not both "thought straight?" And should not they both be willing to bridge the gap with clasped hands, and say, "I greet you, my brother?" Had Luther thus been able to reconcile his natural differences with Zwingli at Marburg, granting to the latter complementary intelligence and a commensurate grasp of the truth, the subsequent course of Protestantism would doubtless

not have been diverted into parallel channels. But it was his inability to appreciate the universal fact of psychological variation which permitted the German to brand the Swiss a heretic.

We may sum up the foregoing remarks in the apt statement of Van Dyke:<sup>10</sup> "There is one point in which all men resemble each other: it is that they are all different,"—and at once we see that we have been stating only a truism. Still we seem to lose all sight of its common but essential importance when we enter the theological sphere. Here one naturally desires to find unity and certainty, for one is dealing with truths which are vital to human welfare. One wants to know beyond the peradventure of a doubt that his creed is true. But the average man will consent only to his own interpretation of it, and is unwilling to admit that another may have an understanding of it equally logical and spiritual. He forgets that his understanding and statement are not identical with the truth itself, and that his interpretation is only one of several possible alternatives, each "orthodox" and in a measure correct. For one must remember, in the light of our foregoing remarks concerning variation, that orthodoxy can not be defined as a set form of truth, nor an elaborate and closed system of such forms, but an *attitude* of unswerving intellectual and emotional honesty in which one approaches the problem of truth. This conception of orthodoxy makes it possible for two people holding rather divergent views of the same truth to be active members of the same church. Each has his own conception of the Bible, for example, and neither view would exactly fit into the other. One holds with tenacity to the theory of verbal inspiration, and considers each book equally valuable for the development of moral character; the other holds that God's word is, indeed, to be found within the pages of Scripture, but only in a fallible form conditioned by the human agencies through whom He gave His message to the world. Each sees God back of the Bible, but each has his own conception of the manner in which

<sup>10</sup> "The Gospel for an Age of Doubt," 6th ed., p. 3.

the book was originally prepared and how it is to be used to-day. Yet the former view is not so divergent from the latter as it appears to be, for no one who holds it in theory maintains it absolutely in his practice. And were orthodoxy to consist in merely correct opinion *plus* general acceptance, it would be difficult to determine which believer is the more orthodox; for the former view is the one more generally accepted, while the latter is probably nearer the truth. Yet we call both men Christians, earnest, honest, and logical. It is their difference of viewpoint which accounts for their difference of conception: to the one, revelation is final and complete; to the other, it is progressive and changing. The common idea which renders their membership in the same church permissible is their belief in the reality of revelation.

This variation in personal creeds in the same religious organization is paralleled by a similar variation among the many organizations of the same general period. The "church militant" is one of the common terms of the day. We hear many flattering comments upon her splendid growth, her conquests of sin, and the sense of righteousness she is instilling in her contemporary world. But at the same time there is everywhere evident theological distinctions which somewhat reflect upon the stock phrase, "all *one* body we." Back of each denomination there is an inheritance of tradition, habits of thought, methods of work, and singular viewpoints which press its present beliefs into its own peculiar molds. For instance, consider the age-long problem of Divine Sovereignty *vs.* Human Freedom, and note the contrast in thought between two great branches of the Protestant church,—Methodism and Presbyterianism. Back of the latter there is an hereditary legalism which had its rise among the Latins. Augustine, though himself a Numidian, who came under the influence of the lawyer-bishop Ambrose of Milan, and John Calvin, the two foremost exponents of Divine Sovereignty, were both held under the spell of Latin imperialism in which the will of the emperor was the sovereign law. By mere theological trans-

literation God becomes the sovereign Lord of the universe, and in His hands alone rests the eternal destiny of His subjects. In the fulness of time, through the agency of John Knox in Scotland, Presbyterianism is born into the world with its full predestinarian emphasis in the Westminster Confession.

On the other hand the opposite view, Freedom of the Will, is most strenuously stressed by modern Methodism. During the eighteenth century in England morality was of the easy-going variety, but in no country of the Old World was there such a measure of liberty. There were a few choice spirits who remained true to the highest ethical standards, and who felt that the time was ripe for a thoroughgoing reformation of the neo-paganism which was fast sapping the vitality of the age. Whitefield and Wesley *et al.* initiated a movement which was religio-social in character, making its appeal to that "bit of Godlikeness," innate in the human soul, which is free to expand under the influence of God's grace to an almost infinite degree.<sup>11</sup> Their emphasis was placed upon free will,—an emphasis which was in strict accord with the democratic ideal of the period. As a result, the message of modern Methodism turns upon the point of man's voluntary reconciliation to God. "Come to Jesus" is one of its stock invitations. But man must be *free* before he *can* come.

Now neither has quite ignored the theological position of the other, for the hymnology of Methodism,—and it is the hymnology of a church which expresses the theology of the common man—has a goodly portion of songs which glorify God as *King*; while modern Presbyterianism is not altogether averse to revivalism, which has its root in free will,—is in fact becoming increasingly attached to that form of religious work. While each church is indeed partly overlapping that arc of truth which is determined by the viewpoint of the other, still each is emphasizing mainly that portion which has come to it in the ordinary course of its traditional inheritance.

Here, therefore, are two branches of the Christian church

<sup>11</sup> Davenport, "Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals," 1910, p. 137.

holding two rather divergent views which in the past could not by any possibility be harmonized. Which church is the more "orthodox?" Or dare we say that both are orthodox? If we limit the idea of orthodoxy to that religious conception which has weathered the storms and stress of time, then we must perforce grant orthodoxy to Presbyterianism, for Divine Sovereignty held sway for centuries prior to the rise of Methodism. But if we regard orthodoxy, not as a static theological system, but as an intellectual and emotional method of approach to the problem of truth, and at the same time remember that our viewpoint is always determined largely by both training and tradition, then we may properly assert that both churches are orthodox; for Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom are simply two different aspects of the same problem: the relation of the divine to the human personality. But each view must supplement the other before we shall be nearer the whole truth. And the problem of human life, the solution of which induced theologians to find in Calvinism or Arminianism the common denominator, can actually be resolved only as one makes the grand circuit of viewpoints and considers truth from all possible angles. Even then there will be a residuum which just escapes the definitive power of the theologian. We should be very chary, therefore, of imputing orthodoxy to any particular one of the numerous branches of the Christian church to the neglect of the others. For it is very probable that the sum total of all their denominational tenets falls a trifle short of the truth itself. And the realization of this fact enables us, in this day of scientific insight, to greet one another as "brother."

During the "World's Fair" of 1893 there was convened in Chicago the World Parliament of Religions,—by some considered a treacherous compromise of Christianity with paganism, and a veritable breach of trust by the American church. By others it was regarded as a wholesome sign that Christendom is returning to the Pauline conception, which is at the same time thoroughly scientific, of the essential oneness of the

race;<sup>12</sup> that truth is not the monopoly of one people alone, but that each has a sight of it, however faint and glimmering,<sup>13</sup> which under Christian influences will brighten and deepen until it fairly approximates that of the ripest Christian experience. The Parliament of Religions was a tribute to the universality of spiritual insight, which reaches its highest development in Christianity.

This was nicely illustrated in the course of lectures which Charles Cuthbert Hall<sup>14</sup> delivered in the far East in 1906-07. In these lectures he states that it is the mission of Pantheism to testify to the being of God, a truth which not all churchmen will be willing to concede. But Hall is quick to declare, also, that this idea must be further supplemented and extended by another which the Christian religion alone is able to offer,—the moral character of God. While Pantheism testifies to the presence of God in the soul, in a more or less abstract way, Christianity clearly does so by the sure presence of the still small Voice, the positive message of Prophecy, and the Incarnation. In these lectures which did much to break down the barriers of prejudice among the upper classes of the Orient, we have an incisive presentation of the fact that the whole truth has not been intrusted to one individual alone, or group of individuals, or even to one faith, but that it is perceived here and there in more or less clear outline by those who approach it with open minds and earnest hearts; and that it is most clearly perceived by those who come into the closest fellowship with Jesus Christ and experience his saving grace.<sup>15</sup>

Again, we witness this variable insight into truth in the general stream of history. Here the real nature of orthodoxy becomes more readily apparent. In the light of the past centuries it can no longer be considered a unified system of permanently established beliefs. The history of the church is replete with the rise and *fall* of verbal formulations of truth.

<sup>12</sup> Acts 17: 26.

<sup>13</sup> Acts 10: 14; Rom. 1: 14.

<sup>14</sup> "Christ and the Eastern Soul."

<sup>15</sup> Cf. also Alexander, "Christianity and Ethics," 1914, pp. 33, 34.

Here, again, we must remember that the overturn of the official statement has not involved the loss of the truth itself; it simply declares that the church of a later age was not satisfied with the precise form in which truth was presented by a former generation. Thus the Atonement, long a central element in Christian theology, has been variously interpreted since the days the fact it symbolizes came to pass. During the first ten centuries the idea of the Atonement revolved solely around the *death* of Jesus which was construed as a ransom paid to the devil, into whose hands man had fallen through Adam's sin. But Anselm, an orthodox theologian of the eleventh century, who would have been a heretic in the sixth, revolted from the crassness of the notion, and proceeded to work out a new theory which we call the Substitutionary: Christ becomes man's substitute. By his perfect obedience, he satisfies God's justice and cancels man's infinite debt of sin. Thus he made it possible for divine love to become operative in the pardon of sinners.<sup>16</sup> This theory was an improvement upon the older in that it avoided the idea of a deception played upon the devil, and made the Atonement depend upon the idea of justice. It became, in the main, the accepted theory of the church. But it is not quite so satisfactory to the church of to-day. We are now passing through one of the world's great transition periods in which perception is enlarging, experience broadening, thought-forms changing, and all theories in a state of flux. Our theological beliefs are being tinctured by the concurrent conceptions of the day. We are no longer content to think of God merely as a moral governor, bent only on having His justice fully satisfied; we want democratically to think of Him also as Father, whose moral character prompts Him to come into the closest relationship with His children so that He may save them from their sins; we have ethicised our idea of punishment so that it is losing rapidly its former vindictive character and is becoming reformatory in its purpose; and the idea of substitution which was entirely justified by the

<sup>16</sup> Anselm, "*Cur Deus Homo*," Deane's ed., 1903. Welch, "*Anselm*," 1901.

juridical conceptions of the eleventh century, has become altogether obsolete. We now think that Jesus' chief function was to "show us the Father" and His love, so that we might hate sin and be reconciled to His love. And we are broadening the scope of the Atonement, so that Jesus' whole life will be included in any theory which we shall hereafter construct.<sup>17</sup> In our re-working of the theory we are not surrendering the fact; we are simply demanding a more ethical interpretation of the fact.

The history of the doctrine of Total Depravity bears the same witness to our developing insight and our ethical demands. There are many passages in Scripture which seem to lend credence to the belief in man's utter degradation,<sup>18</sup> but it was not until the days of Augustine that the idea was put into doctrinal form. Under the influence of Calvin the Protestant church retained this doctrine which the Roman church had always insisted upon, in theory, if not so explicitly in practice. Human nature was presented in its most hopeless aspects, and the position of the church virtually robbed it of all ethical implications. But in recent years, under the influence of anthropological research and Biblical criticism, we have discovered the one-sidedness of the doctrine, and are now peering around the edge toward the other. We have found that the Bible contains many other passages which hint at the real moral worth of man.<sup>19</sup> And we have found that even in the most primitive races there is "a dim consciousness of some higher power and a latent capacity for good."<sup>20</sup> We now believe that there has always been existent in man, long before the dawn of written history, a moral potency which needs only

<sup>17</sup> "The Minister and the New Theology," REF. CH. REV., 1912, p. 395 ff.

<sup>18</sup> Ps. 51; Rom. 7; 1 Cor. 15, *et al.*

<sup>19</sup> Ps. 8; Luke 15; Acts 17: 27 ff.; Matt. 10: 30, 31, etc. But we must not make the mistake, which is fatal to any scientific interpretation of Scripture, of merely weighing one passage against another. We should attempt to glean the *general tenor of a book*, or of the teaching of Jesus which is the norm for all the rest of the Bible.

<sup>20</sup> Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

the opportunity for its evolution; that human nature is neither utterly corrupt,—else the gospel appeal would be useless,—nor perfect, else the same appeal would be pointless. The heart of man rather gives evidence of two tendencies, towards evil and towards good, and it is the fundamental purpose of religion to repress the former and develop the latter.

We have not yet gained, it is true, a full insight into human personality. There is the whole realm of the subconscious which still awaits our scrutiny, and which will doubtless throw interesting sidelights upon the subject of the religious and moral instinct. But this fact alone should warn us against presuming to pass final judgment upon all questions relating to the nature and ultimate destiny of the soul. We have not yet reached that point where we can impute infallibility to human judgment, though we are probably progressing in its general direction.<sup>21</sup> But we shall travel a long road until the goal is reached. Therefore, it ill becomes any man or group of men to attempt to stifle one's moral convictions in the quest of truth, or to suppress that quest itself, under pretense that we already have "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Such a dictatorial course breeds prejudice, fanaticism, and skepticism,<sup>22</sup> while it shows itself blind to the clear facts of history. Galileo's world continued to revolve in spite of the pope's edict. And the late pope's encyclical against modernism, while it may have intimidated the more timid among the Roman clergy, has not by any means crushed the movement itself. People are doing to-day just what they have always done,—using their divinely appointed powers of rational thought. They are not content, and never have been, with the concepts, intellectual, moral, spiritual, of a prior age, but are creating their own; and it should be the province of the church to afford this prevalent spirit of inquiry an environment which will be favorable to the formation of judgments which will be both logical and ethical. This century

<sup>21</sup> Matthews, "The Gospel and the Modern Man," 1912, pp. 51-54.

<sup>22</sup> Robertson, Sermon on "Skepticism of Pilate."

regards the cemetery as the only place where investigation has ceased and where theories are fixed.

We presume that it is very clear, by this time, without the need of further argument, that the theological statements of the church to-day are not those of the church of the tenth or sixteenth century. The church, however, still believes in her orthodoxy; she is still trying to "think straight" upon the eternal facts of her gospel. But she is casting aside, rather slowly it is true, the "orthodoxism" of ecclesiastics and councils, and is now more open to the great problems of the day and the scientific method of their solution.<sup>23</sup> She is gradually losing her former interest in the Index and "heresy hunt," and is more freely permitting her followers to enter the inner shrine of truth by whatever path affords the clearest prospect. She is changing in both her spirit and methods. She is beginning to realize that she has outgrown the naïve notions of her youth, and is coming into possession of the maturer powers and higher vantage-ground of riper experience. It is very natural, therefore, that her understanding of truth should be, and is, more rational, though none the less spiritual, than it was in the day of Anselm or Luther. She is adopting the inductive method of religious inquiry, and is leaving room in her conclusions for those modifications which further research and experience will necessitate. She is beginning to admit that all has not yet been said upon the great themes she preaches, and that it is still possible for the Holy Spirit to lead her into the further reaches of truth. But the most promising factor in her gradual transformation is her growing realization that she cannot pack a universe of truth into a narrow formula, nor take her position on any hill with the positive assurance of seeing the whole world. All our views are but partial, all our formulas shallow: truth is more comprehensive and deeper than either. The church is beginning, therefore, to reopen the questions she long considered closed, and to await with expectant air the message which further revelation will

<sup>23</sup> Eucken, "Can We Still Be Christians?" Gibson's tr., 1914, p. 201 ff.

declare.<sup>24</sup> And therein is the omen of her new and better day.

But just here someone may object that if truth cannot be stated with any assurance of finality, if our knowledge is so very imperfect, can we be sure of anything; and what becomes of the authoritative tone in which the church has hitherto preached, and that feeling of confidence with which one has always believed? Will not our temple of revealed truth topple over into ruins, and will not the sense of uncertainty, which is thereby engendered, in time be converted into open skepticism?<sup>25</sup> There is some warrant for the objection, one must admit; for shallow minds which are content with nothing short of *ex cathedra* dictation, will be deprived of their moorings, and may be inclined to drift upon the current of an only too prevalent unbelief or indifference. But there are certain facts concerning whose reality there can be no doubt, which are woven into the very warp and woof of not merely our beliefs but of our experience as well, and which lend a steadying influence to our religious inquiries: (1) the being of God, demonstrated, indeed, not by any measure of scientific data, but by the venture of faith; (2) the moral order, which ever erects a high standard for human aspiration; (3) man, imperfect, ever struggling to attain the moral goal, but never reaching it; (4) sin, that all-pervasive and discordant something which eternally checkmates the best efforts of the race for perfection; (5) the need of a redemptive power; (6) the presence of that power in Christ Jesus. These facts furnish us a sufficient background for all our religious inquiry and are able to direct the general trend. With these we may proceed to erect a theological system which will be both ethical and intelligible,—and less than that it dare not be. For in theological construction the primary aim must be the presentation of formulas which will be consistent with the logic of life. None other will satisfy. With these basic elements of our

<sup>24</sup> Peake, "Christianity: Its Nature and Truth," for general treatment.

<sup>25</sup> Eucken, *op. cit.*, for a crisp and positive answer.

faith and this aim of our study always before us, we need not be fearful of straying either towards "dogmatic stagnation," or towards that extreme liberalism which has lost its sense of balance. Nor need we feel that the church will lose her authoritative tone and the believer his confidence. For confidence and authority are secured, not by external imposition, but by that internal witness to the truth which is its own best evidence of genuineness.

As we progress in our theological construction we must always keep two facts in mind, if we wish to be essentially "orthodox": (1) the fashion of thinking and mode of expression of our age; (2) the inadequacy of any system to express the whole truth, and therefore the strict necessity for its perpetual revision.

1. Doubtless no one will insist that we think in precisely the same manner as did our forebears of the first century. While our mental processes may be substantially the same, still the content of our reflection is always slowly changing. Our scientific inductive method is furnishing us with new generalizations. Our very thought-forms are evolving with the culture and tendencies of the time, and our theological concepts must naturally accommodate themselves to the changing order if they shall obtain the attentive ear of the masses.<sup>26</sup> The rapid rise of the democratic idea during the past century will overthrow many a thought-form which has become very dear to us,—as it, in union with the modern conception of personality, undermined the old theory of predestination. We have long spoken of the "kingdom of God," a thought-form of the first century; but to-day we are thinking and speaking of the "democracy of man." Mulford showed himself sensitive to the change when he labelled his dogmatic with one of democracy's word-forms.<sup>27</sup> This change alone will compel us to inject the idea of loving service into our concept of our relation to God and man; while "brotherhood," one of the catch

<sup>26</sup> Smith, "Social Idealism," Ch. on "Ethical Transformation."

<sup>27</sup> "The Republic of God," 1886.

words of this day, is rapidly opening our eyes to the social aspects of the gospel. But be that as it may, the modern mode of thought is bound to react upon our theological system, causing it to revise its terminology and, to a degree, its content. We cannot be satisfied with the mere preachment of implicit obedience to the great King, when the very atmosphere of the age is surcharged with the current of sonship and brotherhood.

2. With our present view of the world as a changing order we must recognize the need of a growing theology, which Forsythe<sup>28</sup> terms an "alert" theology. Contrary to the dictum of the Preacher that "there is nothing new under the sun,"<sup>29</sup> our knowledge is periodically receiving new accretions, while our shifting viewpoints are broadening our insight and transforming our notions. Truth which has long been "crushed to earth" by the sheer weight of tradition is being elevated to its rightful place; while we are constantly adding to the pages of revelation "as the words of the Lord are still opening their meaning, under new providential lights, in the enlarging thought of the Christian world." As long as theology remains a true science it will never become static. The deadest church in Christendom is the *Orthodox* Greek Catholic, which regards revelation as completed, and Christianity as absolute conformity to an archaic expression of faith. That "the world do move" theologically is imperceptible to the primate of "the Golden Horn."

Thus we are beginning to perceive that the modern mind is entering into its Protestant inheritance which guarantees freedom of thought and untrammelled critical investigation. Symbols which expressed truth satisfactorily to a former period of the church are now found to be inadequate for their present task. "Orthodoxy" itself is no longer certain of the permanent form of its content, but is slowly realizing that a

<sup>28</sup> "Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind," H. & S. Lib. ed., p. 203 ff.

<sup>29</sup> Eccle. 1: 9.

changing order needs a changing formula. In fact it is looking into the mirror of the modern thought-world, and is beholding itself transformed: its very essence is no longer "settled thought" but "right thinking,"—that is, along the lines of common experience and well established principles. And the twentieth century is more firmly convinced than any other that "we know (only) *in part* and we prophesy in part";<sup>30</sup> and that we shall know fully only when we have reached that final stage in our spiritual growth where we shall see things as they are. Until that time comes, however, we must be content with proving all things and holding fast to those which temporarily satisfy us, ever looking to the future to reveal whatever is now obscure, and ever faithful to the Spirit of Truth as it enables us to "draw from our treasure things new and old."<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> 1 Cor. 13: 9.

<sup>31</sup> Matt. 13: 52.

V.

THE LOGOS DOCTRINE.

WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER.

One of the peculiarities of the Fourth Gospel is its peculiar use of the word *λόγος*. There is nothing like it in the New Testament. Even the expression, "the Word of life," in 1 Jn. 1:1, is not quite like it. And one of the singular things about the use of the word is the fact that the author makes no apology for it, and gives no explanation of the peculiar sense in which he uses it. Evidently the term must have been familiar to his readers, so that there was no need for such an explanation. And all this we can readily understand, if we recall that there was a Logos doctrine current in the East, and found among practically all peoples who had given serious thought to things divine,—Greek, Persian, Egyptian and Hebrew. A Logos doctrine had been developing among the Greeks for well nigh six hundred years, before our Gospel was written; and it had reached its fullest development in Egypt and Asia Minor during the first century of our era. It was as common in philosophical systems of that day as the doctrine of evolution is in ours; so that the author of the Gospel could count on being understood by his readers, however difficult we moderns may find it.

There is, however, one broad difference between the use of the word in the Gospel and in Greek philosophy. In Greek philosophy generally, and especially in the Stoic and the Alexandrian, Logos meant both reason and revelation; in the Gospel it means the latter only. There is no evidence, either in the Prologue or in the rest of the Gospel, that the author used the word in any other sense than that of revelation or utterance. We shall have to recur to this distinction again;

we mention it here because of its bearing on the entire discussion.

### 1. ELEMENTS OF THE JOHANNINE DOCTRINE.

Given the conception of God as spirit, invisible, unknowable and unapproachable, except as he reveals himself, which is characteristic of this Gospel, and something like a Logos doctrine is inevitable. It is, in fact, a necessary corollary to the doctrine of God; and we find it in fact in all parts of the New Testament, as well as in all ancient philosophy, though the term may not be used.

It will be best for us to try to gather up the elements of the Johannine conception, before we attempt to study the relation of the doctrine to the rest of the Gospel or to the systems of thought which were prevalent in that day.

John speaks of the Logos in two great relations: in relation inward and upward toward God; and in relation outward and downward toward the creation and man.

1. In relation to God four things are affirmed; and three of these are found in the very first sentence.

(a) "In the beginning was the Word." There was no time when there was no such self-utterance of the divine Being. Though John conceives of God as spirit, who can be known only through some form of self-expression, he does not think of him as a solitary monad, wrapped up in eternal self-contemplation, and only coming forth in the form of a self-revelation, when he became weary of that supreme and awful solitude; he conceives of him as always coming forth in such self-revelation. Hence he says, "In the beginning," beyond which our human thought can not soar, "was the Word," implying the thought that the Logos is as eternal as God.

It is worthy of notice that the verb used is *ἦν*, which both by its tense and its original significance suggests the idea of eternity. Westcott says, "The verb *was* does not express a complete past, but rather a continuous state. The imperfect tense of the original suggests in this relation, so far as human

language can do so, the notion of absolute supra-temporal existence."

(b) "And the Word was with God." Our English preposition "with" expresses the significance of the original very imperfectly. The Greek preposition is *πρός*, not *μετά*, nor *παρά*, nor *σύν*. *Πρός* denotes motion towards, and suggests the idea of personal intercourse. Westcott has this suggestive comment: "The idea is not simply that of coexistence, as of two persons contemplated separately in company (*εἶναι μετά* 3:26), or united under a common conception (*εἶναι σύν* Lk. 22:56) or (so to speak) in local relation (*εἶναι παρά*, 17, 5) but of being (in some sense) directed towards and regulated by that with which the relation is fixed (v. 19)." It suggests the idea of face to face, as if God and the Word had existed thus face to face from everlasting. If it does not express personal relation, in the same sense in which we speak of two persons as standing face to face in social intercourse, it implies a distinction in the divine Being, to which our notion of personality furnishes the nearest human analogon.

(c) "And the Word was God." Here *θεός*, though occupying the first place in the clause, is undoubtedly the predicate, as brought out in our versions. It is without the article. 'Ο *θεός* is used of God in the absolute sense, the Father. The simple *θεός* here, without the article, denotes rather that the Word is thought of as divine in essence, without affirming identity with the Father. And yet the word is not *θεῖος*, in which case we should have to translate, "The Word was divine," which would evidently fall short of the author's intention. What he wishes to affirm is that the Word, who thus was from the beginning, and who was in such face to face relation to God, is none other than God. As he is God in the infinite depths of his being, so is he God in this outgoing, in this self-revelation of his being; so that what we come to know in this self-revelation is not something different from God in his inner being, but God as he is in himself.

(d) To this Word, now, the author of the Gospel ascribes

the properties or attributes of God. "In him was life, and the life was the light of men." But life and light are attributes of the Father. Thus God is the "living Father" (6:57), the One who alone has "life in himself" (5:26). So the Epistle says, "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all" (1. 1:15). But of the Son the Gospel affirms that the Father has given to him to have life in himself (5:26); so that he quickeneth whom he will (5:21), and even raiseth the dead (5:25; 6:44). As he is the effulgence of the Father's glory, so he could say of himself, "I am the light of the world" (8:12). These affirmations that the Word is life and that he is light are simply particulars under the general affirmation that "the Word was God." The Word has the properties and attributes of God.

2. With reference to the relation of the Word to the creation and man, John likewise affirms four things.

(a) The Word is represented as the Mediator between God and the creation. As the self-revelation of God, the form in which he comes forth out of the infinite deeps of his being in self-utterance, the Word becomes the form in which the divine intelligence, the divine energy and the divine love go forth in creation and redemption.

(b) The Word is hence the Agent through whom the universe was called into being. "All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made." This does not mean that the Word is the Creator. Though John does not stop to affirm creation directly of the Father, his whole argument implies it. The Father, the One for whom the title *ὁ Θεός* is uniformly reserved, is the "Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." But the Gospel just as clearly implies that it is not the Father in direct, unmediated activity, but the Father *through* the Word. The Word, as God in his outgoing energy and love, is the active Agent in the creation, the One through whom the energy, forever resident in the Father, goes forth into activity. Hence the emphatic statement, "And without him was not anything made." He is

behind the entire universe, as the active, efficient cause, through which it has come into being.

(c) In entire accord with this conception is the other that the Word is the One through whom all things are upheld, and through whom all intelligences are illumined. "He was in the world," and in it as the same efficient Agent as in the beginning. The Epistle to the Hebrews, whose conception is so similar to that of the Fourth Gospel, has the classic statement on this point. "Who being the effulgence of his glory, and the very image of his substance, and *upholding all things* by the word of his power" (Heb. 1:3). The Gospel carries out the idea especially with reference to the animate creation. "In him was life, and the life was the light of men." All that lives has derived its life from him. He is the One through whom the life of God, who alone is the fount of life, is mediated to the world. It is so with reference to our natural life; and so also with reference to our regenerate life. And as he is the effulgence of the Father's glory, so is he the One through whom the light of him in whom is no darkness at all, shines upon all who can see and know. Even while the world was in a state of alienation from God, his light was shining in the darkness (1:5). And wherever men have responded to his grace, he has become the light of all their seeing.

(d) And this Word now, of whom all this is true, "became flesh." That is really the culmination of the entire creative process. Wherever in the creation we find the expression of thought and reason (and we find it everywhere), we see it ultimately as the embodiment of his truth and light. Through all the ascending series of creation, the divine reason comes to ever clearer and clearer expression; and thus every form of life becomes in ever greater measure, an effulgence of the divine glory. We find a form of the self-utterance of God, the highest form of which is found in the Word made flesh, in every form of life; but that self-utterance was, not in articulate speech which addressed itself to the ear, but in acts and deeds which addressed themselves to the eye. So when we

come to his last, his final Word, we find it, not in the form of articulate speech, but in a life, the life which was full of grace and truth. And so the author of the Gospel comes finally to identify the Word with the historic person of Jesus.

Such in brief is the Johannine doctrine of the Logos. Its central thought is the self-utterance of God, who is otherwise unknowable and unapproachable. On the one side the doctrine assumes the eternity, the personality and the divinity of the Word; and on the other, it affirms that he is the Agent through whom the entire universe was called into being, that he now upholds and illumines all creatures, that he became man, and that he has dwelt among us, full of truth and grace.

## 2. WHENCE DERIVED.

Whence the author of the Fourth Gospel derived his Logos doctrine has long been a question in controversy. There are those who think that the main influence was Greek philosophy. Others think that we must look mainly to Hebrew sources. I shall quote three of our more recent authorities to illustrate this difference of opinion.

Professor E. F. Scott may be taken as a fair example of those who find the chief source of the Johannine Logos doctrine in Greek philosophy, and especially in Philo. He says, "The idea of a Logos, an immanent Divine reason in the world, is one that meets us under various modifications in many ancient systems of thought, Indian, Egyptian, Persian. In view of the religious syncretism which prevailed in the first and second centuries, it is barely possible that these extraneous theologies may have indirectly influenced our Evangelist; but there can be no doubt in regard to the main source from which his Logos doctrine was derived. It had come to him through Philo after its final elaboration in Greek Philosophy."<sup>1</sup>

Professor B. W. Bacon occupies a position almost directly opposite. He says: "The roots of the Johannine Logos doc-

<sup>1</sup> "Diet. of Christ and the Gospels," pp. 49, 50.

trine are only to a slight and subordinate degree in Philo. They run back by way of Hebrews and more especially by way of the great Pauline epistles of the second period, Colossians and Ephesians, through purely Christian soil to the common ancestor, the Wisdom of Solomon. We have said, 'All of the Logos doctrine but the name is already present in the Pauline epistles.' We might say with almost equal truth. 'The whole Christology of John—a vastly greater matter than the merely cosmological concept of the Logos—is a straightforward development of the incarnation doctrine of Paul.'"<sup>2</sup>

Professor William Sanday occupies a somewhat intermediate position. He says: "The preponderance of opinion at the present time doubtless leans to the view that there is some connection between the Logos of Philo and the doctrine of the Logos in the Fourth Gospel. But the question is as to the nature and closeness of that connection. On this many shades of opinion are possible."

"It is a distinct question in what form we are to conceive of Philo's teaching as coming before him (*i. e.*, the Evangelist). The author of the Fourth Gospel was a thinker, but not a professed philosopher. So far as we can judge from the writings of his which have come down to us, we should not be inclined to credit him with much philosophical erudition. The idea that we form to ourselves of the Evangelist is not that of a great reader always poring over books. I find it hard to think of him as sitting down to a deliberate study of the Jewish scholar's voluminous treatises. The mental habits of the two men are too different. The Evangelist has a shorter and more direct way of getting at the truth. He was more like the old Ionian philosophers, who looked up into the sky and out upon the earth, and set down the thoughts that rose in them in short loosely connected aphorisms. The author of the Fourth Gospel did not look so much without as within: he sank into his own consciousness, and at last brought out to light what he found there. He dwelt upon the past until it became luminous to him; and then he took up his pen."

<sup>2</sup> "The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate," p. 7.

"I believe that there is a connection between Greek, or Hellenistic, speculation and the Fourth Gospel. But I can conceive of this best through the medium of personal intercourse and controversy."<sup>3</sup>

It is a grave question as to whether Professor Scott has succeeded in making out his case. That there is some connection between the doctrine of Philo and that of the Fourth Gospel may, indeed, be admitted; but that is a very different matter from asserting that the author of the Gospel derived his doctrine directly from Philo. The connection may be no closer than is found in the fact that both stood in the same general world of thought, and that in that world of thought this same Logos doctrine met them each in his own environment and in his own way. Even Professor Scott is compelled to grant that the Evangelist has profoundly modified the doctrine of Philo. He says, "Thus in accepting the Philonic idea, St. John does not commit himself to the precise interpretation that Philo placed on it; on the contrary, whether consciously or not, he departs from the characteristic lines of Philo's thinking." And he falls far short in his attempted proof that the Evangelist was a student of Philo's books, or that he was even acquainted with them.

What shall we say of Professor Bacon's theory that the Johannine Logos doctrine rests immediately on Paul? Of course, the term Logos does not occur in Paul. That is conceded from the beginning. But are not all the elements of the doctrine found in Hebrews and in Paul? And is not the central element found in the teaching of Jesus? We believe that both questions may be answered in the affirmative.

We take up first the connection of the central element in the doctrine with the teaching of Jesus. That central element of the doctrine is found in the fact that Jesus is the final and perfect revelation of the Father. As we have already pointed out there is one fundamental difference between the Johannine doctrine of the Logos and that found either in Philo or in the

<sup>3</sup> "The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel," pp. 183, 188, 189, 198.

Stoic philosophy; and that difference is found in the fact that, while both Philo and the Stoics think of the Logos as both immanent reason and uttered thought, the author of the Fourth Gospel uses the term only in the latter sense. Now, this conception of a revelation of an otherwise invisible and unknowable God is found in the whole New Testament, and grounds itself on the teaching of Jesus; and with it is to be associated the claim which Jesus made for himself that he, and he alone, is the perfect revelation of the Father. "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever he willeth to reveal him" (Mt. 11:27; Lk. 10:22). This conception passed into the universal teaching of the early church, as may be seen by comparing Heb. 1:3; Col. 1:15 and Jn. 1:18. And in the discussions of the Johannine Logos doctrine sufficient recognition of the fact, that its central and fundamental element is thus anticipated in the teaching of Jesus and of the entire New Testament, has probably never been given.

Can we accept Professor Bacon's view that the whole Christology of the Fourth Gospel, including the Logos doctrine, can be traced back through purely Christian soil to a common Jewish ancestor? The first half of his proposition, I believe, may be safely accepted. All the elements of the Johannine Logos doctrine, without the name, can I think be found in Hebrews, Colossians and Ephesians; and in accepting these as part of his common Christian heritage, the author of the Fourth Gospel was not under the necessity of making any such profound modifications as Professor Scott tells us he had to make in accepting the doctrine of Philo.

As the point is of great significance in the discussion of the question in hand, it may not be out of place to enter into a somewhat closer examination of the similarity between the Johannine doctrine and the earlier New Testament writings. We take up the points in the order given above.

The first point has reference to the preexistence of the per-

son whom John identifies with the Logos. This is none other than the historic Jesus. "In the beginning was the Word." That the author of the Gospel claims preexistence for Jesus Christ is well known.<sup>4</sup> But the same conception is found in Paul, especially in Phil. 2:6; Col. 1:15-17. These passages imply the preexistence of the Son just as clearly as Jn. 1:1 implies the preexistence of the Logos.

The second point relates to the independent personal existence of this preexistent Logos. We have seen how the idea is implied in the second clause of the first sentence of the Gospel. But does not Paul imply it just as clearly, when he says, "Who being in the form of God, counted not the being on an equality with God a thing to be grasped?" And does not the whole description in Col. 1:15-17 imply it?

John applies the term *θεός*, as a predicate, to the Logos. If the punctuation of Rom. 9:5, which is found in all our versions, be accepted, we have an exact parallel; even if we accept the punctuation which is suggested in the margin, we have evidence that Paul held as high a view of the divinity of our Lord as the author of the Fourth Gospel. Philippians 2:5-11 may be confidently appealed to as furnishing a parallel to the thought, if not to the exact words.

As to the point that Jesus Christ stands as the only Mediator between God and man, to communicate eternal life and to illumine our darkened understandings, the conception is fundamental to the whole Pauline system. It is sufficient to refer to Rom. 5:10; Eph. 2:1-6; 1 Thes. 4:13-17.

The cosmological conceptions of the Logos found in Philo and in the Greek philosophies are reduced to the minimum in the Fourth Gospel. All that is left of them is found in the third verse of the first chapter. "All things were made through him; and without him was not anything made that was made." A more emphatic statement is found in Col. 1:16, 17. "For in him were all things created, in the heavens and upon the earth, things visible and things invisible, whether

<sup>4</sup> See Jn. 3:13; 6:62; 8:58.

thrones or dominions or principalities or powers; all things have been created through him and unto him." Even the epistle to the Hebrews has as much on this point as the Fourth Gospel, where it makes the statement concerning the Son that through him also God "made the worlds," and that he "upholds all things by the word of his power" (1:2, 3).

Of the doctrine of incarnation there can be no uncertainty. Philo knows nothing about it at all; and the author of the Fourth Gospel can not have derived it from him. But Paul is full of it. According to Philippians 2:5-11, the one who existed in the form of God, took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men. According to Colossians 2:9, "all the fulness of the Godhead dwelt" in the historic Jesus "bodily."

Personally I feel convinced, therefore, that Professor Bacon is far more nearly correct in his view as to the immediate background of the Johannine Logos doctrine than Professor Scott. The relation between the epistles of Paul and the epistle to the Hebrews on the one side and the Fourth Gospel on the other is so close, that I can have very little doubt that the fourth Evangelist has derived his doctrine directly from them and not from Philo or the Greek philosophy. There is a purely Christian soil out of which his whole conception has legitimately grown.

This, of course, still leaves the other question as to the source from which the doctrine in Paul and in the epistle to the Hebrews is derived; and that is a far more difficult problem. For the history of Christian doctrine, it is also the more important question; but for our present purpose, we need not enter upon its discussion. It is a question by itself, far larger and far more difficult than the Johannine problem; and it leaves room for the question suggested by Professor Sanday as to the possibility of some other connection between the Johannine Logos doctrine and that of Philo.

## 3. HOW JOHN CAME TO USE THE TERM LOGOS.

If, however, the roots of the Johannine Logos doctrine are thus found in a purely Christian soil, if all the elements of the doctrine without the name are already found in the Christology of Paul and of the Epistle to the Hebrews, how did the author of the Fourth Gospel come to use the term? My judgment is that the answer to the question must be found along the line of a suggestion by Professor Sanday, above quoted. He says, "I believe that there is a connection between Greek, or Hellenistic, speculation and the Fourth Gospel. But I conceive of this best through the medium of personal intercourse and controversy."

Let us recall for a moment the purpose and aim of the Gospel. It was not primarily biographical or historical or philosophical, but evangelistic. The author tells us what he had in mind in writing. "But these things are written, that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye may have life in his name" (Jn. 20:31). The author of the Gospel, whoever he may have been, lived in a new age, and he was surrounded by a new culture. He tried so to present the gospel of the kingdom that the men of that new age and of that new culture might be able to understand and believe. His entire Gospel is an interpretation of Jesus to that new age and to that new culture. His theme is Jesus Christ, the Son of God. That Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, is the premise from which he starts, and the conclusion towards which his whole argument moves. He had back of him the whole heritage of the Christian message and of Christian doctrine; and at the very heart of that message was the great declaration from the lips of Jesus himself, "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever he willeth to reveal him" (Mt. 11:27). And in Asia Minor he now lived among a keen-witted, philosophical people, who had long speculated as to what the inner mind of God is and how it is revealed. He found there the results of all this long line of speculation from

Heraclitus on down to the Stoics and Philo; and in presenting his message he now in effect says, What you have long since been searching after, this I preach to you. You have been speculating about the Logos, in whom you shall find the revelation of the inner mind of God. This inner mind and character of God has been manifested in One who has tabernacled among us, who has manifested the glory, glory as from the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth. Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is this Logos, about which you have been speculating. In him you will find revealed all that God is, all that is in his mind, all his gracious purpose in our creation and redemption.

We may thus admit that there is some connection between Greek speculation, yea, the philosophy of Philo and the Fourth Gospel; but the connection is not found in this that the author of the Gospel had made either Greek speculation or the philosophy of Philo his starting point, but in this rather that he has used them as the form or vehicle for expressing the ideas which he had derived from an altogether different source. Though the Logos doctrine is found in the Prologue, the Logos idea is not his starting point. That must be sought rather in the passage at the close of the Gospel, in which he tells us of his purpose and aim. He begins with the idea of Jesus as the Christ, the Son of God; and because he has found in him the perfect revelation of God, he calls him the Logos.

It is true, the contrary position has been taken. Professor Scott says, "Jesus was the revelation of God because the Logos, the divine principle of Philonic speculation, became incarnate in him."<sup>5</sup> This is a reversal of the true order of thought, as this is presented in the Gospel. The way in which the Evangelist gets at his concept that Jesus is the Logos is just the opposite. Through a great religious experience, he had become convinced that in Jesus he had found the revelation of God; this experience had its basis first of all in the direct declaration of Jesus himself; and from that declaration and that ex-

<sup>5</sup> "The Fourth Gospel," p. 162.

perience he then passed on to the conclusion that Jesus was none other than the being of whom the philosophers had vainly speculated, the Logos of God.

It is important to recognize that there is such a profound religious experience lying at the basis of what has been called the speculation of the Fourth Gospel. Sometimes it is charged that the author started from a metaphysical conception, and that consequently his entire presentation has been more or less vitiated. It is, I am persuaded, more nearly correct to say that he started from a deep and rich religious experience, and that the metaphysical dress was put on to recommend his message to a speculative people. To this experience the author himself points in 1:14: "And the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us (and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father) full of grace and truth."

#### 4. RELATION TO THE REST OF THE GOSPEL.

What is the relation of the Prologue, with its Logos doctrine, to the rest of the Gospel? In a famous article, published in 1892, Professor Harnack took the position that the Prologue is a mere preface, written to conciliate the interest of a philosophical public. The following quotation states his view: "The Prologue brings in conceptions which were familiar to the Greeks, and enters into these more deeply than is justified by the presentation which follows; for the notion of the incarnate Logos is by no means the dominant one in the Gospel. Though faint echoes of this idea may possibly be met with here and there in the Gospel—I confess I do not notice them,—the predominating thought is essentially that of Christ as the Son of God, who obediently executes what the Father has shown and appointed him."<sup>6</sup>

Now, while it is true that critics generally have dissented from Harnack's view; it is admitted that his essay has served to show that the purpose of the Gospel is not that of a philosophical treatise, and that its main concern is not with the

<sup>6</sup> Quoted in "Dict. of Christ and the Gospels," Vol. I, p. 889.

Logos as a philosophical conception, but with the Logos incarnate, or with the historic person, in whom the Logos has become incarnate. My own conviction is that he is right on two main points of his contention: first, in the statement that the predominating thought of the Gospel is that of Christ as the Son of God; secondly, in the view that the Prologue is a true preface to the Gospel, and that it subserves the purpose of a preface in commending the Gospel to the author's Greek readers.

It is doubtless true, as Harnack's critics have maintained, that the main ideas of the Prologue recur again and again throughout the Gospel; but that is due to the fact that those very ideas were already a part of the author's Christology, not because he found them in the Greek speculations concerning the Logos. As I tried to show above, all the leading elements of the Johannine Logos doctrine had already found their way into the Christology of the epistles of Paul and of the epistle to the Hebrews. This Christology the author of the Fourth Gospel received as a part of the common Christian heritage. It was part of the message which he undertook to proclaim and interpret to the Greeks of Asia Minor; and it was because of this fact that we find them both in the Prologue and in the rest of the Gospel.

I hence do not deny the organic connection between the Prologue and the rest of the Gospel. What I am contending for is that the essential elements of the Prologue were part of the Christology of the times, and that Harnack is correct, when he says, that the Prologue was written as a preface to commend the message which the author was about to deliver to his Greek readers.

Professor William Sanday has admirably expressed the view, which I have been trying to advance, in the following paragraph: "The fact that St. Paul and the epistle to the Hebrews had substantially arrived at a Logos doctrine before any extant writing has mentioned the name, seems to throw light on the order of thought by which the Fourth Evangelist himself

arrived at his doctrine of the Logos. It is the coping-stone of the whole edifice, not the foundation-stone. It is a comprehensive synthesis which unites under one head a number of scattered ideas. From this point of view it would be more probable that the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel was a true Preface, written after the rest of the work to sum up and bind together in one mighty paragraph the ideas that are really leading ideas, though scattered up and down the Gospel. Whether it was actually written last does not matter. What I mean is that the philosophic synthesis of the events recorded in the Gospel came to the Evangelist last in the order of his thought; the order was, history first and then philosophical synthesis of the history. No doubt the synthesis was really complete before the Apostle began to write his Gospel; the writing of the Prologue may or may not have followed the order of his thought. It may have been as Harnack thinks, a sort of commendatory letter sent out with the Gospel; or it may be that the Gospel was written as one piece upon a plan present from the first to the writer's mind. The order of genesis and the order of production do not always coincide; and it is really a very secondary consideration whether in any particular instance they did or not."

"The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel," pp. 211, 212.

LANCASTER, PA.

## VI.

### THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVIL.

PAUL J. DUNDORE.

#### I. A STUDY OF THE NATURE OF REALITY AS BEARING ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF EVIL.

The construction of a philosophical doctrine on this problem of evil calls, at the very outstart, for a clear and definite conception of the nature of reality. The writer contemplates to develop his doctrine along the views of Idealism, but feels that a brief statement of other views and their fallacies will bring the Idealistic Philosophy bearing on the subject in clearer view.

(a) Deism conceives God as creator of the world much after the fashion of a man building a ship. As the ship is separate from its builder or designer so God is distinct from nature and man which he has created. The Deist ascribes existence of things to an omnipotent and all-wise Being who has formed it externally as an architect fashions a house. The world, including man, resolves itself into a mere mechanism. This conception of the world bears on the subject of good and evil for it would make man a mere machine and it would be difficult to see how evil could arise and how responsibility could be placed. But experience teaches us that man is a being that realizes ends and also consciously aims at them. If we say that these ends which man pursues are dictated for him mechanically by God, it is evident that we can no longer view man as a self-determining being. But good and evil imply a moral agent that possesses self determination. Instead of God being external to the world and as a moral Governor of the world imposing laws upon man, we must view God as immanent and as related to man, not in a sense that

God determines man's actions for him but rather that man is capable by his own will to choose objects in harmony with the nature of God and willing what is in consonance with the divine will. The problem of evil demands man to be a self-determined being.

Deism, claiming that the world is created by a good, wise, beneficent God, a perfect Creator and Governor, can not explain the problem of evil. How can the imperfect world be the product of a perfect Being? The manifestation of a perfect God in an imperfect world would involve a contradiction and the Deist's conception of the world contradicts its conception of God.

(b) Phenomenalism states that our knowledge has only to do with appearances and not with reality. Democritus viewed knowledge as attained by sense perception as knowledge of appearance and knowledge attained by reason as knowledge of reality. He was a partial phenomenalist. Plato views sense perception as giving us an opinion of objects which objects are only copies of reality. Sophists conceived sense perception to be but momentary appearances of things, not the things in themselves. Phenomenalism is of necessity sceptical for it denies knowledge of reality. In consequence evil becomes unreal and as the phenomenal implies the real or noumenal, the doctrine leads to Agnosticism and leaves the problem of evil unsolved. Spencer says, "What is known is not real and what is real cannot be known." Thus the limitations of knowledge would forestall the solution of the problem of evil.

(c) Absolutism as bearing on Pantheism and Mysticism. Pantheism and Mysticism would deny nature and man any separate reality. ~~Here nature and man are thought of either as modes of God, or illusions that eventually disappear when man attains his highest point of view, and God, the Absolute reality, is all that is left.~~

When the idea of the Absolute is maintained, the Absolute which gathers up into itself and transmutes individuals in some way that we cannot comprehend, we virtually abolish all

individuality and self-determination on the part of the several beings. By positing this abstract Absolute, nothing is left but a blank undefinable reality and all differences vanish. We must not permit the finite to be swallowed up in the Infinite for this will rob the finite of reality. The philosophy of Spinoza and Hegel manifests this tendency. But this is Pantheism. Absolutism maintains "that in the Absolute evil and pain disappear, being absorbed in a higher unity." In the Absolute, the good and the evil are transmuted and glorified. Thus the explanation of the universe according to the theory of Absolutism does not explain the moral distinction of good and evil, but rather explains it away.

The theory of Absolutism, which makes facts mere phenomena, which phenomena are indefinable and not within the grasp of intelligence, resolves the Absolute to a pure or abstract being. This logically leads to Mysticism where virtually all relations, even that of subject and object, are abolished. To the Mystic the whole sphere of scientific knowledge is viewed as occupied with what is merely illusion. The Mystic conceives Man's true life as consisting in religion and in this life he shares the Apprehension of God and comes into a direct contact and communion with God. This lifts them above all finitude, change or division which is foreign to the Absolute. Mysticism errs in maintaining that man completely transcends his individuality and is merged in God. It abolishes the distinction of man from God. Separation of man from God would make room for a division and man would have no consciousness of himself but it surely does not follow that in his consciousness of God he loses consciousness of himself. According to the Mystic the world and man, as divorced from God, are necessarily illusive and in consequence evil resolves itself into an illusion. Evil ceases to have any reality. Evil to the Mystic, if anything, is the insatiable desire of true and absolute being which attaches to everything finite. There are desires in the body which keep him from being absorbed in the Infinite. The morality of the Mystic consists in the struggle of

separating the soul from the body. Morality, however, is viewed as a fruitless effort in converting the finite into the infinite and in consequence morality is without meaning to the Mystic. The Mystic in his contemplation of the eternal has nothing in common with every day life but seeks to be lifted beyond the moral and become absorbed in the Infinite.

(d) Naturalism, which holds that the doctrine of the conservation of energy is the fundamental law of all existence, and embraces not only physical and chemical, but also organic and conscious processes, has no satisfactory solution for evil. In Naturalism all things are interpreted in purely mechanical terms. Naturalism claims that there is "not an atom either in the nervous system, or in the whole universe, whose position is not determined by the sum of the mechanical actions, which the other atoms exert upon it. And the mathematician who knew the position of the molecules or atoms of a human organism at a given moment, as well as the position and motion of all atoms in the universe capable of influencing it, could calculate with unfailing certainty the past, present and future actions of the person to whom this organism belongs just as one predicts an astronomical phenomenon."<sup>1</sup>

Here law is inviolable. The world is subject to this rigid and inviolable law and moral acts of man are not accounted for inasmuch as only a self-determining subject lifted out of this mechanism, is capable to act. In consequence, good and evil have no meaning when we view all occurrences in accordance with the unchangeable constitution of the world and all laws by which its processes are determined as inviolable.

(e) Idealism. As we have seen Naturalism threatened the extinction of the religious consciousness and Mysticism threatened the extinction of the human consciousness. Subjective idealism, which borders on Solipsism, claims that the subject merely perceives the idea of the object, not the object itself. Here the essence of anything consists in its being perceived,

<sup>1</sup> Quoted by J. Watson, "The Interpretation of Religious Experience," p. 150, Vol. 2.

"Esse est percipi." It reduces reality to the experience of the individual subject.

The Philosophy of Idealism aims to establish a unity between subject, object and God. It posits the subject at the outstart and views the universe as being intelligible. The universe is not alien to our rationality for if such were the case it would be a suicide to our rationality. The subject and object are interdependent according to the system of Idealism. Neo-Realism errs in making subject and object independent of one another. Idealism believes in a relation between subject and object which relation is manifest in our conscious experience. The subject is the self that experiences and the object is that towards which the subject directs itself in its experience. That is subjective which is in experience and that is objective which is for experience. We cannot know reality outside of experience and experience is the consciousness regarded as common to all subjects through their being related to objects. Idealistic Philosophy, therefore, deals with experience forthcoming from the relation of subject and object.

The object has both active being and meaning. An object has active being which gives expression to reality. But mere existence or being is not sufficient. This would end in nothing. Idealists regard reality as being with meaning. The object has meaning for the subject. The violin, in relation to the master musician who plays it, conveys its meaning to the subject and its content becomes an element in the subject's reality. Thus through experience we organize the appropriate meaning of things into our own reality. The Idealist views object as incomplete without the subject. Realism claims the object is what it is apart of the subject. But the object must be brought into experience which is due to the relation of subject and object. In experience we find reality and what does not agree with the whole of experience must be rejected as false. Reality implies the knower and the thing known. The subject can not think, feel and will without the object. We are not subjects without objects. In order to

know the self we must distinguish it from not-self. Thus reality is only conceived in its subject-object relation and nothing can be known to us that falls beyond our conscious experience.

But in our treatise we are not concerned merely about the subject and object relation but both subject and object are related to the all-comprehensive unity of God. God must be the inner principle of both the physical and conscious world. The conscious subject recognizes that the world is no arbitrary creation of his own mind and thus the subject rises to the consciousness of the Creative Mind which is immanent in the world. This mind is immanent both in nature and in the self-conscious life of man. This mind immanent in nature gives it its meaning and it is only as our mind enters into communion with the Divine Mind that we comprehend the object and its meaning. "As truly as it is part of our nature to look outwards and fill our life with objective interests, as truly as it is the part of our nature to look inwards—to return upon ourselves and to become conscious of an inner life of our own in which we are separated from all others—so it is part of our nature, as immanent necessity of our rational being, to look upwards, and to regard our whole life, inner and outer, as based upon and circumscribed by a Power, in whom we and all things live and move and have our being. Hence the consciousness of God is as near to us, as necessary to us, as the consciousness of the world or of the self; nay, in a sense, it has a higher necessity than either, and we are nearer to God than ourselves; for the consciousness of self rests upon the idea of God, as at once its first presupposition and its last end and goal. All our life is a progress through the world and through ourselves to the God from whom we come, in whom we are, to whom we tend."<sup>2</sup>

We find that God is manifest in the world or else it would be unintelligible. God also communicates Himself to man and realizes Himself in the spiritual nature and history of

<sup>2</sup> E. Caird, "The Evolution of Religion," Vol. 2, p. 2.

man. We come to a knowledge of the world as a system because it is the embodiment of Mind and our life is the fullest expression of the Mind of God.

Man has a correspondence with God which amounts to identity. There is in man a spark of the Infinite and man is able to transcend the limits of his finite existence or he would never become conscious of his finitude. There is a unity of nature, self, and God. "The conflict with evil is the struggle towards that unity with oneself which is inseparable from unity with God. Were it not that man's self-consciousness involves the presence in Him of this ideal of perfection, he would be satisfied like other beings, with the gratification of his immediate desires and inclinations; but, because nothing short of absolute perfection of nature can give him permanent satisfaction, his spiritual life is necessarily a struggle towards an ideal, which he can only realize in the sense that it is the principle of his undying efforts."<sup>3</sup>

But this unity of man and God raises the question, how can God be immanent in man, while man preserves his individuality? Man is a rational being and therefore self-conscious. This is implied in his struggle after the divine ideal. Again, the action of mind upon mind does not destroy freedom and individuality but rather implies the presence of freedom and individuality with the one who is influenced. The immanent Spirit of God in the human mind receives response from a similar spirit and the influence of the indwelling Spirit is in essence identical with the influence of one human mind upon another.

Rudolph Eucken in his book, "Christianity and the New Idealism" speaks of the immanence of God in these words: "Whence the red of the rose? From the sun you say. True, but the sun did not reach out its red hand and paint the red of the rose from without. The red of the rose comes from the rose's own heart, but it does not come from its own heart with-

<sup>3</sup> J. Watson, "The Interpretation of Religious Experience," Vol. 2, p. 245.

out the influence of the sun. And it does not come from the sun without the activity of the rose. Somehow the activity of the sun and the self-activity of the rose come to be one and the same thing. There would be a contradiction were God a stranger and external to our being, were His will imposed upon us from without like a law differing from that of our own true nature. There is the inner presence of God in man, and its mysterious and ceaseless working within all the manifestations of man's personal life. God lives in us. We live in God. Our freedom is His authority. His authority is our freedom. His spirit makes us what we are. His voice is the voice of our conscience. To obey the will of God is to obey our own law. To obey our own law is to obey the will of God." The Divine immanence of God in man does not destroy man's conscious self-activity.

Confusion may also arise as to the immanence of God in the world. We believe in His immanence and His transcendence. God and the world are not two separate realities. The rather do we think of the world of nature and the world of spirit as two books written by the same hand, the one throwing light upon the interpretation of the other. But how is God in the world? Pantheism teaches that God is in the world as an unconscious intelligence, unpurposeful, wholly absorbed in the universe He has created. Instead of granting Him self-directing power they view God as a slave to the world He has created. Divine immanence means that God is in the world and at the same time fully conscious, purposeful and controlling. God is in the universe like the spirit of a man is in his body, which spirit is not limited by its body but is capable of activities that far transcend the physical realm. God is present in the world but also surpasses it. He is superior to it as a thinker is superior to his thoughts. But the thinker does not live apart from his thoughts but in them. So God is greater than His creation but does not separate himself wholly from it.

God is both immanent and transcendent. By immanence

is meant that He is everywhere and always present in the universe, not absent from it nor separate from its life. By His transcendence we mean, not that He is outside of this world and views it from beyond or above but rather that while God is in the universe, He is not shut up in it or limited by it. God, therefore, is a free spirit, inhabiting the universe but surpassing it,—immanent as always in the universe and transcendent,—as not subject to limitations. Each conception is in need of the other. Transcendence without immanence would give us cold Deism; immanence without transcendence would give us fatalistic Pantheism.

Hilderbert's hymn gives us a correct view of God's immanence and transcendence.

“Above all things, below all things;  
Around all things, within all things;  
Within all, but not shut in;  
Around all but not shut out;  
Above all, as the Ruler;  
Below all, as the Sustainer;  
Around all, as the embracing Protection;  
Within all, as the fullness of life.”

What I have sketched rather briefly indicates the trend of philosophical Idealism. It lays a foundation for the interpretation of evil in the world. Idealism not only has to face the problem of evil but philosophical Idealism as it seems to the mind of the writer is the only philosophy that is in a position to give a rational solution to the problem.

The world is intelligible and rational. There is no dualism where two powers contend with one another with equal power. It is a universe in the true sense of the term in which all finite things seek to embody the will of the Infinite Self. The ego has not to do with what is mere phenomena but with reality that reaches its completeness in experience. All is united in the Self towards “which all creation moveth.” The individuality of man is not absorbed in the Infinite but free-will has a genuine existence in this world and moral choice is present with man who is a free moral agent. This moral

freedom does not belong to the temporal order of the world in so far as it is merely temporal, but to a higher order of which we are apart and not unconsciously so. The God of the Idealist is no passive spectator to the sorrow, evil and misery in the world but is "with all as the fullness of life" both purposive and controlling. These thoughts we must bear in mind as we seek to interpret the problem of evil.

## II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL AND PHYSICAL EVIL.

Evil may be classed as two species, physical and moral. The term physical evil represents the evil that may be suffered and the term moral evil, the evil that may be done. In the physical realm philosophy must emphasize the principle of evil rather than its manifestations. Of the two kinds moral evil is the more positive whilst physical evil may be incidental, occasional and more of a negative character.

Both moral and physical evil are interwoven and at times it is difficult to establish a fixed boundary line and assign one, to one side and the other, to the other side. Physical suffering is frequently the result of moral evil. The distinction between the two may seem vague but nevertheless we are obliged to make the division. Moral evil falls under the categories of choice and action, physical evil under those of result and consequences. As stated physical evil is the evil men suffer, moral evil is the evil men do. Physical evil is conditioned by an established order or by the operation of fixed laws whilst moral evil has to do with a moral agent who has a will to choose and in consequence follows as an act of the personal will. In our further treatment of evil we shall treat both separately although to some extent the solution of the existence of the one is a solution for the existence of the other.

## III. MORAL EVIL.

### 1. *Origin of Moral Evil.*

(a) *Psychological Genesis of Evil.*—This leads us to attribute the cause of evil not to a thought beyond, but to a de-

velopment, in which the finite will strives to free itself from its natural impulse and enter into the realm of freedom. The child in the beginning is prompted to act by a natural impulse which is altogether natural and unaccompanied by any moral judgment for the child has as yet not entered into the state of the moral. These natural impulses cannot be classed as evil for in the first stage a child is not truly in a position to pass moral judgment and hence no evil that implies guilt.

But the child ere long finds its self-will to run counter the will of another, a will foreign to that of the child. This other will from without prohibits the expressions of the natural impulses and desires of the self-will and heretofore unrestricted desires are checked by the opposing will as it seeks to enforce its prohibitions. The bringing of the self-will into subordination to the prohibiting will is gradual and only results after a number of experiences. But by these experiences the self-will subordinates itself to the prohibiting will and also gives way to feelings of sympathy and regard to this higher will. This in time leads to fear in disregarding the command of the foreign will and a seeking after the reasonableness and rightness of this higher will with its prohibitions and commands. In realizing the rightness of the command "Thou shalt not" law and its feeling of obligation to meet it, dawns upon the child and the child through these complex experiences assumes the responsibility of a free moral agent. In this gradual development of self-will and its subordination to the higher will the placing of the first sin is impossible. Self-will, which seems the first apparent evil in the life of the child, must be overcome and subordinated to the higher will. Self-will, however, is first and has a tendency to continue its opposition to the law and in consequence there is a continual struggle between the "would" and the "should." The constructing process of the moral consciousness is a development, a development resulting from many experiences and it is true that in this development the possibility of moral evil is universal although the actuality of evil need not be universal.

No moral evil is conceivable, therefore, until a certain stage of development in the moral consciousness and the idea of Original Sin as implying guilt has no place in a treatise on the origin of sin. Moral evil only results from a conscious self-determination against the moral law. This gives us an idea of evil which seems rational and causes us to view man as developing not as fully developed. Moral evil develops in man much like the knowledge of his own consciousness. He looks outward, inward, and upward. "Every step in the development of conscience, every widening of the moral view, every increase in the refinement of judgment or in instinctive feeling of right and wrong, augments the possibility of reaction against abnormal impulses, of overcoming the bad motives by good ones, and thus increases with man's moral freedom his responsibility also for what he does and leaves undone."<sup>4</sup>

(b) *Moral Evil in the Light of Biological Principles.*—In the study of biology, the science which studies the life and structure of living organisms, including man, there have been for some years past, two contending theories advanced by two schools of the biologists. The one theory known as pre-formationism holds that the whole history of one's life is contained in a germ present at the earliest stages of one's life and all that one is ever likely to become is potentially present in that germ. All that is needed is merely to unfold oneself as years glide along and the duty of man is to unpack the treasures he already possesses in the embryonic form. The other theory known as epi-genesis reduces the germ factor and pre-existing conditions to a minimum and recognizes environment, one's surroundings as the main forces that determine the destiny and character of the human life. A number of scholars are prone to ascribe the development of morality and evil wholly to social influences brought to rest upon the child. Dr. Tennant, in his excellent book, "The Origin of Sin" speaks of morality "as a social creation and not as a ready-made endowment of the individual." This is true but we dare not overlook the

<sup>4</sup> Pfleiderer, "The Philosophy of Religion," Vol. 4, p. 38.

individual who as an individual has the endowment of capacity and who is endowed with the capability of becoming a moral creature. Morality as pointed out in the psychological genesis of moral evil develops by the self-will being antagonized by a higher will but individuality is present in the self-will. Self becomes conscious of self through other selves and so morality develops through a social process but this social process is not all that contributes to moral choice which makes evil possible. The theory of Epi-genesis is untenable.

The theory of Pre-formationism also errs in placing all of what a child is to be potentially in a germ which gradually unfolds itself throughout life. This theory might fall in with the Augustinian view of pre-destination or election. It would harmonize with the Leibnitzian Monadology. But to us it puts too much on the beginning of things and robs man of his initiative. The theory known as Epi-genesis savors too much after Pelagianism, holding that the actuality of sin is derived solely from the individual will as influenced by social environment. The theory of Pre-formationism savors too much after Augustinian pre-destination.

Rather let us think of the child starting out with a certain individuality which is grounded in God. The individuality gives the child power to choose and create his own destiny. The child with such individuality is not the creature of his environments nor is the child a passive spectator watching the unfolding process of what was potent in the germ but the child creates his own environment and determines himself the form of what comes out of the germ in its process of unfolding. Environment has its influence but by holding the individuality of child foremost we do not disconnect life from its evolutionary process but also give it a metaphysical ground. The child as a creature of God has power to act and is endowed with a freedom akin to that of God.

(c) *The Will and Moral Evil.*—The afore-mentioned statements leave the will of the individual free and unfettered and prepare us to say that evil has its origin in the creature and

not in God. The origin and essential quality of moral evil lies in its antagonism and revolt of the personal will against the sovereign will of God. "In its essence the act creative of moral evil is, to use a juridical phrase, 'a violation of law'; to speak with the stoics, it is a refusal to 'live according to nature'; to employ the language of Butler, it is the failure to recognize 'the authority of conscience'; or in that of Kant, it is to decline to obey 'the categorical imperative.' In these cases 'law,' 'nature,' 'conscience,' 'categorical imperative,' are but impersonal names for the ethical sovereignty of God; and the denial of this sovereignty means the alienation in will and character of man from his Maker. It is this denial and consequent alienation that creates and constitutes moral evil in its two ultimate forms, act and character, or choice and habit, or will and nature."<sup>5</sup>

Moral evil arises when man cuts himself off from the parental spring of rationality and spirituality and permits himself to be influenced by capricious impulse and lower animal propensity. The will, having revolted against reason and spirit, submits to lower passions and impulses and by choice permits these to predominate over the better self. It is a choosing of a supposed lower good for the ideal good. Evil arises in seeking for the satisfaction of our nature in particular, selfish ends instead of choosing to identify oneself with the good of the whole. Evil leads one to choose an end which is incompatible with the universal self. He strives to make his own separate good his end, not taking into consideration the injustice and wrong done to others and thereby loses the blessedness which ensues from an unselfish devotion to the common good which alone is in harmony with the divine will. "For whosoever would save his life shall lose it and whosoever shall lose his life for my sake shall find it." (Matthew 16: 25.) Again, moral evil can only arise in the will of an intelligent and personal agent. It is apparent that evil in order to become moral must be chosen and the choice made in the light

<sup>5</sup> A. Fairbairn, "*The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*," p. 150.

of a better knowledge. There must be an alternative or there can be no choice. "For apart from the law sin is dead." (Romans 7:8.) Moral evil involves intelligence of the higher good and choice must be ever the differentia of moral evil.

In consequence evil cannot be ascribed to the preponderance of the sensuous, but only to the will. What is commonly called a conflict between sense and reason is in truth a conflict between a lower and a higher mode of self-realization. "All that is of sense is not evil, and all evil is not of sense." Many vices do not spring from sense. This is true of such vices as avarice, ambition, hypocrisy and falsehood. These have nothing to do with sense. We cannot place moral evil in sense but in the spiritual direction of the will. Evil, in every aspect and phase, has its seat in the will and moral evil, including guilt and accountability, is only possible when the will is fully present and where the subject is a self-conscious, a self-determining ego.

Furthermore, no natural impulse or inherited tendency, is in itself sinful. A sensuous impulse or an inborn tendency to sin only can become sinful through our own volition. Moral evil can only arise when we deliberately refuse to reject the impulse. Thus no sin is possible prior to the emerging of the will. Prior to man becoming a self-determining being, intelligent and rational, moral evil in its actuality must be excluded. Moral Evil, then, from whatever angle we approach it, has its origin in the will. Kant said rightly, "Nothing in the world is good but a good will." We might add in the light of our consideration of the origin of moral evil the thought, "Nothing in the world is absolutely evil but an evil will."

But by making the will the seat of moral evil do we not explain away the immanence of God? We would answer, no. Man as a moral agent creates his own destiny. His will is for him to use as he chooses yet God is immanent. The immanence of God does not wipe away distinctions between God and man. God is immanent in nature yet distinct from it.

Even so with man. Both man and nature have no reality apart from God who is the Ground of both. We are apt to think of identity as sameness but true identity is unity in difference. So man and God are identical yet distinct. Man has his own individuality and the immanence of God does not absorb man's individuality. Man is not a passive medium for the display of divine power; if such were the case man would be a free agent no more than the stone which falls to the ground by the law of gravitation.

"Our wills are ours, we know not how;  
Our wills are ours, to make them thine."

God has given man capacity whereby man may know God. Man is capable of so using his powers as to have his will blend more and more with the divine will. Man as a rational being bears these marks of identity and has capability of God-like development but in order to gain this higher self he has to exercise the will which is peculiarly his own. "For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure."<sup>6</sup> But we err in ascribing the whole work to God alone. God reveals the ideal, makes us conscious of it but the activity which responds and accepts and which wars against the flesh is ours. The higher self is not forced upon us but being the life which, when realized, is most true to ourselves, the finite will grasps it and with full freedom to reject it, takes it for its own.

Freedom and development are man's peculiar possessions. God the Creator and man the creature have this in common. As we conceive God as morally perfect we must conceive man as a moral creature. God's creatures, as moral beings, must make their own experience, develop their own characters, watch over their own conduct and in a sense create their own destiny. God would undo His own creation, annihilate or abolish his moral creatures, were He, at a critical moment, to interfere by direct action, with the choice of the human will.

Our doctrine of sin, therefore, leads to this view of finite

<sup>6</sup> Phil. 2: 13.

self. Man is a free, developing being. In the doctrine of divine immanence there is no abolishment of the finite self. God has made man as a rational being like unto himself and when man wills the opposite of what he knows as the good, he commits sin.

(d) *A Reconciliation of God's Omnipotence and Goodness to the Existence of Evil.*—In our treatment of the problem of evil thus far we have reached the conclusion that man is, in a sense, the author of moral evil but this does not answer, as a final solution. It is true that the responsibility of the actuality of moral evil lies with man but the responsibility for the possibility of moral evil lies with God. To say that man is the author of moral evil does not wholly exonerate God. It is very apparent that man could not have sinned unless he had been made capable of sinning. Why did God so make man that he was capable of sinning and if God is omnipotent why does he not so guide and direct the actions of man so that he will not do the evil?

This question becomes all the more vital when one considers the vast magnitude of moral evil. Moral evil in the individual is bad but moral evil is not confined to a mere individual. Moral evil is incorporated in families and is handed down from generation to generation in hereditary tendencies. It is rampant everywhere and possesses and dominates the collective race. Why did God permit such a fearful dilemma? Why did God permit moral evil or why did he make man capable of doing it? Our difficulty lies in our effort to reconcile the existence of evil with the thought that God is omnipotent and the world a manifestation of infinite goodness.

The difficulty at hand vanishes to some extent when we recall from our previous investigation that moral evil is not something that can be imposed upon an individual from without. Evil results in the individual failing to embrace the ideal in Society. Man, we said, is a developing creature, and evil is a lower stage of a higher good, though not good in the making.

Augustine throws a great responsibility upon God when he claims God to have created man morally pure and good and attributes sin, as to its origin, "to the transgression of the first man, who, as representative of the whole race, misused his freedom to will evil, and so introduced that bias to evil which has vitiated the whole human race." This places undue responsibility upon the first man and upon God. The truth is that the experience of Adam is the experience of every individual and the experience is of the same order. In a sense it may be said, man was not created good or evil because morality exists only as willed by a rational subject. No man can be either good or evil without self-determination and this thought lessens the responsibility of God in regard to moral evil. But the question as to why God permits moral evil or why he has made man capable of sinning remains unanswered. Why did not God prevent moral evil?

Much of the difficulty in the solution of this problem rests in our misuse of the word omnipotence. We cannot think of God as a pure abstract being. That would resolve Him to mere nothingness. God as the Creator manifests himself in the universe but such actions, within the finite, implies conditions. There are limitations for God as well as for man. Speaking morally, God is incapable of lying; intellectually, it is impossible for God to conceive the false as if they were the true; physically, it is impossible for God to make a square out of two straight lines. In other words, it is impossible for God to create man as an exact duplicate of Himself. There is but one God and to conceive of two infinities is absurd. God was, therefore, limited in creating His creatures and the creature could not be the exact duplicate of the creator. Surely, many things can be predicated of the creature which we can predicate of the Creator but the Creator always stands for more than the creature. God in His work of creation has His limitations and in creating man as a being of free choice He did all within His power. Even God Himself had the choice of good or evil. If we deny Him of that choice God would have known less than His creatures.

Again, we dare not emphasize the one attribute of Omnipotence at the expense of other attributes that bear a deeper meaning to us in our relation to God. Omnipotence is not the synonym of God and His perfection implies more than what one conceives under the mere category of an Almighty-Will.

Spinoza conceived God as a substance and in consequence was enabled to reduce His attributes to Extension and Thought, the one referring to His activity in Space and the other in Time. If we conceive of God as an unconscious will as did Schopenhauer then His activity in the universe will be minus the moral character and will be as irrational as that of matter, motion and force. To view Him as the purely Absolute, will make Him purely abstract which is a God without meaning.

Viewing God, however, as immanent, as a conscious center of our thought and volition we are led to interpret His attributes and actions under the categories of moral reason and ethical will. The most vital relations God bears to us are ethical and not physical. The physical attributes are largely determined by the ethical. God is conceived as divine not because He is Almighty but because He is the Supreme Good. Love is more divine than omnipotence. "Now we can only conceive an absolutely Perfect Being as one whose nature is harmonious in all its actions and its activities; for might without love were mere violence; presence without righteousness were only energy; omnipotence without wisdom were but intellectual perception,—the reflection of things in a mirror which had the quality of being conscious of the things it reflected. But if we so conceive the Divine Perfection, then all the physical attributes will be under the control of the ethical, and must be conceived as only means, while the others denote sovereign motives and ends. Power may forbear to do many things possible to it as power, because they would be alien to love; and the forbearance would not argue defective but effective will, not imperfect but perfect might, because

exercised in obedience to qualities and for higher than any which could belong to it simply as power.”<sup>7</sup>

The foregoing discussion on the relation of an omnipotent God to moral evil is convincing as far as it goes. God with all His omnipotence could not make man wholly like unto Himself and again the action of omnipotence itself is controlled by a higher motive of Love and Holiness. The question as to why God permits moral evil is not answered satisfactorily. From our consideration another question arises, why was the actualization of evil permitted by a God who was in essence a God of Love and who is perfectly Holy? We have reconciled evil with His omnipotence but we must also endeavor to reconcile the existence of moral evil with the Goodness and Love of God. But to ask why a Good Loving God permits evil is similar to the question “whether the Holiness and Love of a Self-revealing God are better manifested in an entirely non-moral world or in one in which good be possible though mixed with evil, and in which good may yet be the final goal of ill?

Beyond a doubt this world is the best possible world for the development of character which is or ought to be the aim of all rational and moral finite beings. In it there is a range of contingency and existing conditions are well adapted to the development of free moral beings. A world without the possibility of evil would destroy the free self-determination of man, rob the world of conscious moral good and leave no room for a revelation of the Love and Holiness of God. Without the possibility of evil we would have no possibility of good, a world of mere things, of conscious automatons. But the cosmos is a moral order and affords an opportunity for the highest personal relations between finite persons and a personal God and in consequence this present world, with all its moral evil and misery, tends to a goal that is supremely good and in view of the good, moral evil is not incompatible with the love and goodness of a righteous God.

(e) *Moral Evil as a Possibility.*—From our study we reach

<sup>7</sup> A. M. Fairbairn, “*The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*,” p. 154.

the conclusion that moral evil is a possibility in a world of contingency. It is evident that God did not give His consent to the introduction of moral evil but views its presence as a foe to the moral order. Moral evil, therefore, is a contingent product of a moral world, without being willed by God as an end, nor wrought by Him as an act. It on the contrary contradicts the end willed by the holy will of God. Man being created with the freedom of self-determination was placed in a world where there was a possibility for evil and such a possibility for evil may be essential in order that many may attain unto the moral goal as a developing creature.

We would, then, disagree with Schopenhauer who views evil as a positive being and all good as negative. His irrational world, filled with chaos, blindness and mal-adaptation, leads to Pessimism. It identifies being and evil. If being and evil are one and positive and good and rationality are negative then the world is on a process of degeneration and not enough rationality is left to construct a theory.

Likewise the Leibnitzian theory which represents evil as becoming good, being good in the making, does not satisfy. If evil is merely a defect of good or good in the making, evil is in a sense good and Leibnitz loses the evil element altogether. Leibnitz does not seem to realize that evil is the opposite of good and that we must ever strive to suppress it. If so, evil is but mere appearance and has no reality. For if we, with Leibnitz make evil teleologically necessary to the best of possible worlds, we would transmute it into a relative good.

Again, we would part with the Hegelian School where the Absolute is viewed as altogether immanent, absorbing wholly the finite and in consequence all ethical relations between God and man are dissolved and evil ceases to be real. Hegelians would view evil as non-being, and strip it of all reality. But to view evil as unreal is to break with experience and experience to the Idealist is the ultimate basis of knowledge.

Moral evil as it exists in the world cannot be identified with being, non-being or as good in the making though it has its

roots in non-being. Evil is in this world merely as a possibility and the free self-determination of man implies the possibility of evil. The moral order was so constituted as to promote righteousness, obedience and happiness. It would be difficult to conceive obedience where disobedience is impossible or righteousness where wickedness is not a possibility. "The person that could not disobey would be quite incapable of obeying. If there was no power to do evil, there would be no ability to do good. Where the will has no alternatives, its choices can have neither merit nor demerit; where only one path lies before the traveller, error may be impossible, but so is discovery; where there is no vice to allure, there is no virtue to be won. The very notion of a moral nature under a moral law involves therefore, an order that can be broken." From the foregoing we see reason for the possibility of evil but let us bear in mind that evil only becomes evil by one's experience when he, of his own free will, chooses that which is evil. The mere possibility of the existence of evil does not say that a man must necessarily experience it as evil. God's will is that it should remain a mere possibility with us and not an actuality. The possibility of evil was present with us but its actuality should find no place in the contents of our will. We conclude this part of our study with the conviction that God is not the author of moral evil, but that it is a mere contingency in the moral order and that in a universe created where moral good shall be, the possibility of moral evil may exist.

#### IV. PHYSICAL EVIL.

##### 1. *Statement of the Problem.*

The natural and the moral world-order are arranged each with a view to the other, tend to the same goal but are not identical. The laws ruling in each are different and independent of one another. In nature the laws of cause and effect hold sway but this is not always the case in the realms of reason and affection. The belief in the uniformity of nature is ra-

tional but it does not mean that man, allied to some extent to nature in a physical sense, is subject to their natural uniformities. Man is allied to nature but by his reason and his free will he is over nature, is elevated above the plane on which these natural forces work, and the logic of causation can give no explanation of his conduct in those higher realms of thought and feeling. In consequence, natural, or physical evil deserves special study being its cause and sequence differs so materially from moral evil. The physical evils are of many and varied kinds. Here we have the evil arising from the destructive forces of Nature herself as storm, earthquake and volcanic eruption. Evils arise by nature failing to respond to the skill and work of man as famine. Evil is manifest in the disaster which Nature works on the things that man has invented as floods which break through the dykes, and tempests that lay waste the cities man has built. Evil is the result of man's neglect and ignorance of the law of Nature in the form of disease and pain. One could not satisfactorily classify the physical evils as they exist in their manifold forms. Many are the sufferings that Nature inflicts upon man. Yet it is noticeable that often Nature does not act alone and in most cases man, in the last analysis, is the responsible factor of evil and has to shoulder the blame for his suffering.

Beyond a doubt many of the physical evils, in the presence of which we stand horrified, are wrought by Nature and man in conjunction. Man often through ignorance of Nature's laws brings upon himself suffering. Man in conscious violation of Nature's laws brings untold sufferings to himself and the community. Floods, which caused the lives of hundreds of persons to be lost, were caused, in some instances, by the breaking of rotten fish dams kept in communities by groups of men for their sport. Many calamities can be explained from this viewpoint. Many evils considered as God sent are of man's own making. When men herd a million human beings in some narrow compact city, multiply its walls around the city, veil the light of the sun with smoke, poison the

air above and the ground beneath with foul secretions one need not wonder if fevers prevail. If the bubonic plague gets a foothold in the community and men do nothing to arrest its progress one need not wonder if entire families are visited by the hand of death. There is no doubt but what with our increase of knowledge we find more and more of our maladies and sufferings starting plainly from ill-dealing with ourselves. To a marked extent the bodily ills of humanity are wholly our own creation and within our own control. But this does not give us a satisfactory philosophical interpretation of the problem of evil. To satisfy our inquiring minds we must not deal with manifestations merely but with principles that give rise to these manifestations.

The solutions to this problem of physical evil are many. In this study of the subject the mention of some systems bearing on the causal relations of God and the universe will be justifiable inasmuch as a criticism of the same will help us construct a doctrine that is tenable.

## 2. *Misconceptions of God in Relation to the World Bearing on Evil.*

(a) *Transeunt Causality.*—Exponents of transeunt causality view the operations of nature as a process of interaction among the things of nature. The world is filled with independent things. Causality is conceived as a passing from an antecedent to the consequent and the efficient cause is viewed as transeunt, moving on the plane of the phenomenal. Here the antecedent is thought to possess potency or whatever is required to produce the consequent. The antecedent comes into relation with the sequent and answers as a cause to the effect it produces. The antecedent is viewed as active and the sequent as passive.

This is the popular view of cause and effect, the view with which Science prosecutes its work. With such a view we could solve the problem of physical evil in short order. An earthquake is the effect of the formation of sulphurous gases which is the antecedent or cause of the earthquake. But this

does not explain. To treat cause and effect after such a fashion may satisfy Science but not Philosophy. Causality as temporal is nothing but mere appearance. We have to face reality and find causes in the World-ground or Internal ground.

An effect may spring out of an antecedent but an effect has a number of antecedents and one can not attribute a sequent to any single one. To say that  $x$  causes  $y$  leads us to find the cause of  $x$ . This would lead to an indefinite regression and by coming to the first cause we surrender the principle of transeunt causality. In consequence we are compelled to posit the causes in the metaphysical ground or God.

Again this theory of transeunt causality is pluralistic in spirit, positing a multitude of independent, reacting things. If they are independent it is difficult to see how they have a relation to one another, such as interaction implies. Newton's law, that all bodies attract all other bodies directly in proportion to the mass and inversely as the square of the distance may satisfy Science but Philosophy can not conceive an interaction between two mutually independent things.  $x$  cannot transfer its state or nature to  $y$  without becoming  $y$ . But by becoming  $y$ ,  $x$  loses its independence and ceases to be. Apparently between  $x$  and  $y$  there is a void which two independent things cannot pass over. Interaction can only be explained when we posit a Ground and Consequence and root the consequent in this Ground. We must substitute immanent causality for transeunt causality and there only can we find a cause for the sequent and this alone explains the causal relation between the antecedent and the sequent. The mere law of cause and effect on the temporal plane does not give us a metaphysical explanation of physical evil and therefore fails to satisfy.

(b) *Occasionalism*.—The system of Des Cartes left a dualism with which his followers were bound to struggle. Des Cartes' dualism consisted in the independence of mind and body. One could not influence the other. His successors Arnold Geulinx and Malebranche sought to overcome the difficulty by their doctrine of Occasionalism. They sought to bring the two together.

Des Cartes had presented God as the guarantee of truth as regards thought. This prepared the way to view God as intervening to guarantee truth of representation of object. Occasionalism was applied to action even more than to knowledge. Its exponents said on occasion of your willingness to move your arm the divine energy interposes and causes the arm to move. Here interaction of mind and matter was due to the intermediating agency of God. Volition here was the cause of God's intervention and the physical change was the effect. The doctrine was mechanical and limited the actions of God to the caprice of man.

Occasionalism in a modified form is the interpretation applied to much of the evil that is in the world to-day. Many accidents and calamities are ascribed to a direct intervention of Providence. The supernatural power from without is supposed to have interfered with the normal process of the world's or Nature's existence. This is a belief which reduces the cosmos to a medley of unrelated miracles. Rather let us not conceive God to work in this way. There is no interference or intervention from without but God is immanent, the internal Ground, the ever active agency, in which existence finds its complete reality.

(c) *Pre-established Harmony*.—This recalls the Leibnitzian doctrine of monads. He also battled with the question of interaction of real things or monads in the world. His monads are independent and self-sufficient. Each monad is windowless, a universe by itself, non-communicative. Yet they were supposed to interact but this interaction is impossible with self-sufficient monads but he claimed them to be pre-determined to a certain course of action. A monad is like a watch wound up which contains its history for the next twenty-four hours. So he conceived the monads wound up that they run together.

But his plurality of monads demanded an explanation. In consequence Leibnitz posits an infinite monad as the Ground of all monads. This infinite monad pre-establishes in each monad potentially what the course of each individual monad is

to be. But such pre-establishment, pre-destination and fore-ordination shuts out the immanence of God. It gives us an absentee God and tends towards fatalism. Physical evil as it exists to-day is often explained after this fashion. The world is viewed as running its course and calamities and fearful interruptions in the laws of nature are thought to be mere accidents over which an absentee God has no control. It is a common fault that results inevitably from a pluralistic conception of the world. Whatever position we take of evil we must conceive God as the immanent ground and only such a conception will make a satisfactory explanation possible.

*3. God the Dynamic, Active Agent in the World.*

The philosophical problem of evil can only be approached in the measure we succeed in the adoption of an adequate ontology and doctrine of God. The criticism of the three theories mentioned above leads us to posit an Internal Ground which is the metaphysical cause of the varied manifestations in nature. This Internal Ground is active and energizing. The Ground which makes itself felt in every objective manifestation is dynamic, and its essence is reality itself.

By identifying the world-Ground as causality with activity we determine the world-Ground as an Agent who has the power to act. The finite is, therefore, his creation, and in its manifestation represents the purposive expression of will. The Agent is unitary in spirit and indivisible Agency implies selfhood. Instead of the world-Ground being a passive substance we conceive the world-Ground as an active Agent. The Infinite is not divisible. We must bear in mind that we have a universe and not a multiverse. The finite is not an emanation of the infinite. We have not to deal with a plurality of existences but with the one reality in which we live, move and have our being. The infinite is not the sum total of the aggregate parts. To divide the infinite into parts is to cancel it. Thus the finite is in unity with the infinite, being it is the creation of the infinite.

We must be on our guard here or else we fall into pantheism. The creation of God, this is true of man, is capable of acting and of being acted upon. God creates creators. Man is endowed with personality and is able to think, feel and will. If we conceive God as creative then the created things shall also be creative—not in the same degree as Creator but to some degree. We may say that God is in all things but God is not all things. To say that God is all things would make our thoughts, feelings and blunders God's. His own freedom would be at stake and error and evil would be made divine. God has created a moral world-order, the workings of which we may not understand in its entirety. But the difficulties resulting from this conception are far less than the difficulties arising out of systems which view God as a substance and the finite as emanations and kindred systems which are pantheistic in spirit.

We, therefore, posit a basal being in action as the efficient cause of the finite, of all its laws, principles and realities. The finite is dependent on this efficient cause. The Active Agent or world-Ground is not wholly absorbed in this creation. He is not any less a person or Agent after creation than before. He has reserve power and is transcendent as well as immanent. God as the Active Agent is not all activity, exhausting Himself in the world.

The positing of God as the Internal Ground of the world gives us a rational interpretation of the world. It sets aside dualism, pantheism, materialism, agnosticism and other isms that confuse us in this study of the problem of evil. Instead of external relations of things we have an internal relation. We have relations not only between things themselves but the things bear a relation to intelligence itself. The world-Ground is above all things free and active intelligence. "If we seek a tenable theory of knowledge we find it only as we reach a basal intelligence. If we seek to find the many together in an all-embracing system, it is possible only in and through intelligence. If we seek for unity in being itself we find it only

in intelligence. If we seek for causality and identity in being we find them only in intelligence. If we would give any account of the intelligible order and purpose-like products of the world, again intelligence is the only key. If, finally, we ask for the formal conditions of reality we find them in intelligence. The attempt to define reality itself fails until intelligence is introduced as its constitutive condition. The mind can save its own categories from disappearing, can realize its own aims and tendencies, can truly comprehend or mean anything, only as it relates everything to free intelligence as the source and the administration of the system."<sup>8</sup>

4. *Deductions from Doctrine of the Dynamic, Active Agency of God in the World.*

(a) *The World a Good, Rational System.*—The theory of ontology we have developed convinces us that the world is a system that is good and rational. God as the active Agent in the moral world-order is in complete control. Man is a creation of God and being akin to God, man becomes a creator himself. He is not a creator in an absolute sense but man is a creative agent and has the power of the initiative. Man misuses his free moral agency in the misadaptation of laws destined for good and pain is the natural sequence. That God's law contains a possibility of violation is true beyond question. The term law implies that possibility. Man violates not only the moral law but the physical as well and in many instances the violation of the physical is the natural sequence of a violation of the moral law. God's world is just and right but man has thrown himself out of harmony with God's order, has abused God's laws and thereby has brought much of the world's evil and suffering upon himself by his own conscious acts. Much of the pain and sorrow and suffering in the world is due to man's wrong use of right things. The mere fact that man has sexual and sensual passions in his physical constitution

<sup>8</sup> Borden Bowne, "Metaphysics," p. 110.

which impel him to a sensuous and licentious living, does not permit us to extenuate the evil he may do. The rather should we say, he is obliged to obey the law which would turn Nature's way in his hands into an instrument of good; and if he disobeys Nature's laws he is charged with suffering, pain and affliction commensurate to the degree in which he has made Nature the partner and servant of his offence. We conceive Nature, then, as good in herself and evil only when she falls into evil hands and is made a minister to sin. Nature was designed for moral ends by being in the hands of moral beings. This moral order has been broken again and again by man's misadjustment to the moral world-order and in consequence much of the physical evil to-day is not due to the will of Providence as is often supposed, not due to the terrific forces of Nature herself but due to man.

(b) *Teleology and Evil.*—The conclusion we arrived at as the cause of much suffering in the world might lead to the thought that evil is retributive where the moral failure and outward misfortune evenly balance. This would not be the outcome of the argument because man is in social relations and sufferings often light on an individual who is not morally guilty. It is wrong to view every fortunate or unfortunate event as being by itself, apart from the natural causal connection of events, a special divine appointment. God manifests Himself in a regular and orderly way.

Due to our desire to honor the Providence of God and our misuse of sacred scripture we are apt to assign every calamity in nature to God's Providence. Beyond a doubt there is a sublime truth in the sayings, "that not a sparrow shall fall to the ground without the will of the Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered; That all things work together for good to them that love God." But we are not thereby justified to deduce from these words such thoughts for which the words give us no warrant, viz.: that every event of our life, the greatest blessing as well as the greatest calamity, comes from our Father's hand and is an expression of His holy will. We

are but fragments of an organic whole and cannot see the whole from a mere part. We cannot construct a theodicy in every minute detail because we cannot comprehend the whole from a knowledge of the part, the external goal from experience of the temporal order.

A pantheistic monism would strive to find a teleological end in every detail of the world's structure and history. Idealism tells us that whatever we experience is a fragment of the whole of reality and its end is seen only from a wider perspective than man possesses. Teleology is universal only from divine standpoint and man is not committed to it in the sense that he can trace a divine purpose to whatever evil befalls him.

(c) *The Omnipotence of God as Bearing on Physical Evil.*—The treatise given under the Reconciliation of Divine Omnipotence to moral evil will bear on this subject likewise for the most part. It may be wise, however, to emphasize a few additional points as we look into the relation of Divine Omnipotence to physical evil.

Omnipotence is but one attribute of God and not the most outstanding one in His relation to man or nature. In the moral realm we held the ethical relation He bears to man above the physical and in this instance we are forced to hold His intelligence of the moral order in its structure, history and destiny above mere physical force. There are many things God could do that would prevent many sufferings if He would deem it wise. He could cause many interruptions in the laws of the cosmos but by such interventions for different events we would have a medley of miracles instead of a moral world-order. By governing this universe with different laws for different events, human intelligence would be put to confusion. God as the reality of the whole sees the operation of this moral world-order in its entirety, has a vision of the end "to which all creation moves." As an intelligent active Agency He views the world as a unit instead of fragments. He deems it best for the whole in the end not to use His omnipotence in order to interrupt the uniform laws of nature.

We do not deny the omnipotence of God in the foregoing assertions. His immutability does not disprove His mobility. The mere fact that eclipses and storms and tides are determined by unchanging laws does not deny the omnipotence of God. Natural law is unchanging; yet not, theoretically, unchangeable. The laws of nature are not in themselves self-sufficient but are the free and self-determined will of God acting in relation to the creatures to whom He has delegated intelligence and moral life. God's cosmos is in the process of realizing His ends, in the process of its development as man is, and in this development physical evil is a possibility as well as moral evil, but these evils are only incidental in the moral world-order whose final end will be a triumph of the good.

(d) *The Divine Atonement as an Explanation of Suffering.*

—In our study we found God to be the intelligent, active agent of this moral world-order. This basal truth causes us to think of God as being in absolute oneness with the world and its ills as suffered by finite beings. To remove Him from the world as an external ruler and creator would lead us to think of Him as cruel and helpless in regard to our finite ills. In identifying God with the world as we did we also identify Him with the sufferings His finite beings experience. Evil with its sufferings is opposed to the will or reasonable purpose of God and does not meet with His approval, yet it is apparent that it must fall within the sphere of that organic interaction in which the whole life of God unfolds itself, because otherwise there would be no possibility of its being overcome by the reaction of the divine organism of the world-order. Often it is asserted that the fact evil militates against the doctrine of monotheism but idealistic philosophy confirms that doctrine in its treatment of evil. Indeed, "the evil of the world could not be a moment which is destined to be removed and triumphed over in the harmony of the whole were not all the individual powers embraced by the unity of the whole life of God as subordinate moments of it, supported by His omnipotence, arranged by His perfect wisdom in an organic and purposeful system."

But to say that evil falls within the life of God as a moment of it we conclude that it must be felt by God and that He must suffer on account of the evil as it exists in the world. Our sufferings are not alien to the life of God. We exist as partial functions in the unity of the absolute and conscious process of the world. Our existence and our individuality are in an organic unity with the whole life of the Absolute Being. Consequently what we experience God experiences. What we suffer God suffers. Our concern of overcoming grief is His concern. His heart pulsates with ours. There was a time when God was not supposed to suffer. Suffering was thought to mar the perfection of God. But if we should read out of the life of God all passion, emotion and suffering we could not understand such words as, "For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten son, that whosoever believeth on Him, should not perish but have eternal life." (St. John 3:16.)

Our sufferings are God's sufferings and physical suffering is not sent as an external work, a penalty for sin nor is it due to His neglect as the intelligent active agency in the world. Grief, sorrow, pain are not means to an external end but they are a part of the divine life itself. The Cross was a struggle. Jesus was made perfect through suffering and suffering is a law that operates on finite beings as well as God. As stated, God created creators and analogically you may read back from creature to creator. As God is related to evil so are we as His creatures. Suffering is a law interwoven with life. The life most akin to God is not the life that has never experienced hardships and struggles that evil produces but rather the life that has experienced the triumph over evil. A woman on the lecture platform made the assertion that she had not suffered an ache or pain for ten years and through all that time had not a single thought of fear or worry. A stone in a building could offer a similar testimony but not God. There is a oneness existing between God and His creation.

Philosophical Idealism does not remove God from the world

but posits His immanence and as such He shares in our sorrows and triumphs in our victories. It is the right kind of a world for the development of His moral order in which man with repeated struggles reaches out to grasp the whole of life. Physical suffering with all its manifold possibilities is a law of life and God does not desire us to be overwhelmed by it. Such evils are more hardships than evils and are not incompatible with the perfection of the universe. As our struggles are God's so God's triumphs ought to be ours. If they are not the fault lies with us in our failure to live a life in harmony with His life. Evil exists only to be cast down, to be subordinated. The world viewed in its wholeness is an all-perfect ideal. We are finite, developing towards the attainment of the ideal. God is in the process and suffers in and with our ills with the assurance that evil will be subordinated. In this divine atonement we find our reasons that justify our physical ills and their accompanying sufferings.

In our study of this problem of evil we are not given to despair but are optimistic as to the final outcome in view of the fact that God as an ever active agency is working in the world. The Infinite expresses Himself in the finite and helps us and makes it possible for us to attain unto the ideal, unto the wholeness of life of which we are a part. Now we see only in part. "Beloved, now are we the children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him; for we shall see him even as he is."<sup>9</sup> If the novelist would reveal the secret of the story in the beginning of his work it would prove fatal to the interest of the book. The reader digs through its pages having faith that afterwards the plot will be revealed. As finite beings we start out without any definite knowledge of the beginning or the end. That knowledge belongs to the Infinite. But our study enkindles within us the most robust faith in Him whom we can well trust to the end, knowing the end to be a worthy culmination to the world process.

<sup>9</sup> 1 John 3:2.

As to the entrenchment of both moral and physical evil in the world we find our answer in God's relation to His creation. If we cannot say that goodness is at the heart of the universe then we cannot say whether the world is good or evil. But we believe in the divine immanence of God and hence we need not be pessimistic as to the final outcome of things. God's wisdom and goodness are at the heart of things. Satan had his limitations in the temptations of Job and so evil, in its various phases, has its limitations to-day. There is no dualism where two parties of equal power contend with one another. Jehovah is upon the throne and holds the sceptre of power. With goodness at the heart of the universe and God immanent as well as transcendent we have ground for the most robust faith that goodness will prevail.

Though evil is round about us, we, with the right conception of evil and God's immanent relation to the world as its intelligent, active agent, will find true nourishment for our faith and shall say with Job, "Though He slay me yet will I trust in Him."

"I know not what the future hath,  
Of marvel or surprise;  
Assured alone in life and death  
His mercy underlies.

"I know not where His islands lift,  
There fronded palms in air;  
I only know I cannot drift,  
Beyond His love and care."

## VII.

### CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY.

A. V. HIESTER.

Of all utopias, ancient, medieval and modern, the most serious, as well as the most scientific from the economist's point of view, is Hertzka's *Freiland: ein soziales Zukunftsbild*. Written two years after the appearance of *Looking Backward* it clearly reflects the influence of that romance; and its author has frequently been called the Austrian Belamy. Dr. Theodor Hertzka, born in 1845, is a distinguished Austrian journalist and economist, the author of several notable works on economic subjects, a recognized authority on currency questions, who in his general economic views holds or has held to what is known on the Continent as the Manchester School in distinction from the Historical School of political economy.

*Freiland* is in part a reversion to the earlier types of utopias. Unlike such recent ones as *Looking Backward* and *News from Nowhere*, and unlike also the great body of modern socialists who believe that socialism, if it ever will be realized, must come through evolution and not through sporadic colonial experiments, *Freiland* does not in the first instance concern itself with the transformation of a long established social order. Nor does it, on the other hand, as is so commonly the case with the earlier utopias, content itself with the presentation of the finished picture of a magically established and accidentally discovered society of diminutive proportions in some remote corner of the world. What it does do is to exhibit a new society in the making, a social experiment projected on socialistic lines modified by individualistic principles, apart from the currents of civilized life, employing every device of modern science in the conduct of life and the production of

wealth, and rapidly developing from its small beginnings until it is satisfied with nothing less than the conversion of the world to its principles. In this world-conquering quality, and the thoroughgoing utilization of the achievements of modern science, and the consequent large scale on which everything is planned and done, combined with the principle of social experimentation and the making of a society *de novo*, *Freiland* holds a unique place among the world's utopias.

It may appear strange that an orthodox economist should be the author of a social romance. But too much stress must not be laid on the romantic quality of the work. The author had a two-fold purpose in this. "In the first place," he says, "I hoped by means of vivid and striking pictures to make the difficult questions which form the essential theme of the book acceptable to a wider circle of readers than I could have expected to reach by a dry systematic treatment. In the second place, I wished by means of the concrete form thus given to a part of my abstractions to refute by anticipation the criticism that these abstractions, though correct *in thesi*, were nevertheless inapplicable *in praxi*."

*Freiland* is not then an idle dream, but the serious effort of an orthodox economist, who confesses to a considerable change of heart, to solve the strange enigma that despite all the splendid advances in art and science in recent years there has been no sensible mitigation of human misery. That the ever increasing productivity of modern industry has proven, not a blessing, but a curse to humanity, is due, as the author maintains, to the fact that there exists no demand for the many good and useful things which are being produced. And the reason why there is no demand for these things is that the masses, however much they may need and desire them, are not in a position to command them, because they have no right to more of what they produce than is necessary for their bare subsistence. And the further reason why the masses are able to secure from their labor no more than a bare subsistence is that the entrepreneur, the landowner, and the capitalist, make

claim, and are able under existing legal and industrial conditions to enforce their claims, to a large part of the product. The consequence of it all is that the limited demand of the many poor, limited because they are so poor, and the still more limited demand of the few rich, limited because they are so few, fall far short of the productive possibilities of modern industry.

This then is the great question now confronting political economy. Why do we not become richer in proportion to our increasing capacity for producing wealth? The question is essentially modern. It could not have arisen in ancient or in medieval times for the simple reason that human labor was not then productive enough to do more than provide the means of production after satisfying the indispensable consumption demands of the masses and the possessors of property. After the author has answered the question propounded by himself, and after he has analyzed the evil of over-production and under-consumption and referred it to its proper causes, he proceeds to provide a remedy.

*Freiland*, or *Freeland*, the name of the new commonwealth, as well as the title of the romance which describes it, is located in the interior of equatorial Africa where alone is to be found that seclusion which is so essential to the existence of a peculiar commonwealth. And in order to afford still further assurance of the success of the enterprise the illiterate and the criminal have been rigidly excluded from the beginning, since both must of necessity be under constant authority and surveillance; and this is altogether inconsistent with the principle of the absolute self-control and independence of the individual on which *Freeland* is founded.

This principle of self-control is fundamental. Except in the beginning, when production had to be for obvious reasons the common undertaking of the entire community, there has been absolute freedom for every one, so far as his skill and ability permit, to apply himself to that branch of industry which yields the greatest profit. But in order to make this

liberty something more than a name two things are necessary. The first requisite is that every one must know where the largest profits are to be had. This information is provided by the commonwealth through prompt and comprehensive trade reports which give the prices of all commodities, and the amounts of each produced and consumed, during a given period. The other requisite is access to the necessary means of production. This is accomplished by vesting in the commonwealth the exclusive ownership of land and capital, both of which are placed at the disposal of individuals and associations without cost, the only condition being that the capital so loaned must be repaid out of the profits of the enterprise within a given period determined by the nature of the enterprise.

While land and capital are owned in common, houses and other forms of consumers' goods are private property, and can be disposed of as freely at death as in life. The right of bequest is subject to but a single limitation. Between husband and wife there is an absolute community of goods, and only the survivor can definitively dispose of the common property. Private property in houses is limited by the requirement that they must be used by their owners, for as soon as they are let for rent they cease to be consumers' goods and become capital.

With the free use of land and capital there is combined the no less fundamental principle of free association for purposes of production. The former has eliminated the landowner and capitalist from the field of industry; the latter seeks to dispense with the entrepreneur. To insure the success of the voluntary associations, which are organized by the workers to carry on production without the intervention of employer or master, it is only necessary that the members know what sort of persons to set at the head of the enterprise, that they give such persons sufficient authority to direct the enterprise, and that they reserve to themselves enough power to retain the ultimate control of the enterprise in their own hands. This

will assure the necessary managing ability, while the self-interest and absolute equality of the members will secure the necessary industry and fidelity.

Any citizen of Freeland may at any time enter or leave any association whether a member of any other or not. He may belong to any number of associations at the same time; and his share of the net profits of each is determined by the amount of work contributed by him, which is in turn measured by the number of hours he has worked. But this does not mean that all the members of a given association receive the same returns, even when they have put in the same amount of time. One reason for this is to be found in the universal practice of giving to the older members of an association a certain per cent., usually from one to three, for every year of seniority. Skilled labor is paid a similar premium while the labor contributions of superintendents and directors are reckoned as equal to a certain number of hours, more or less arbitrarily fixed, per day. These premiums and ratios are not uniform from one association to another, but are determined by each one for itself.

The highest governing authority in an association is the general meeting in which every member possesses an equal voice. A simple majority is sufficient to carry ordinary motions; for dissolution or liquidation, or for the altering of statutes, a three-fourths majority is necessary. The general management of the business of the association is vested in a directorate elected for a certain number of years by the general meeting, but subject to recall at any time by the same authority. The minor officials are appointed by the directors, but the fixing of their salaries is the function of the general meeting. In addition to the directorate there is a council of inspection, likewise elected by the general meeting, whose powers, largely advisory in character, include the inspection of the books and the furnishing of periodical reports.

The effect of free land and capital, and the principle of free association for purposes of production, by means of which the

workers have solved the problem of organizing and disciplining themselves without the intervention of the entrepreneur, is to leave to the worker the entire product undiminished by rent, interest or profits. This does not mean, however, that labor is the sole source of value. This error of the so-called classical economists, which has been very generally adopted by modern socialism, is not accepted in Freeland. It is true, the worker, gets the whole of the product, not, however, because labor is the sole source of the value of what he produces, but for the simple reason that he is not required to surrender a part of the product to the entrepreneur, the capitalist and the landowner. Now to leave the entire product in the hands of the worker, however it may be explained, not only multiplies the consumption of the masses, and thus serves to correct the constant disproportion between consumption and production so characteristic of the exploitative system of industry, but it also eliminates the conflict of interest between producers which must inevitably arise as soon as consumption falls short of production. In such a conflict each producer, instead of turning out the largest and best product possible, seeks only to secure for himself the largest possible market; and the more he succeeds in selling the less his competitors are able to sell. Hence the interest of one producer is clearly opposed to that of the other.

It is altogether different in Freeland, where, owing to the fact that the total product belongs to the worker, consumption is the measure of production, the one increasing *pari passu* with the other. It is to the interest of every producer, therefore, that every other producer should produce as much as possible, since every increase in production will be followed by a corresponding increase in consumption. And the consequence is a solidarity of interest that is quite unknown wherever labor is subject to constant exploitation.

If it be objected that the practice of providing the producer with free capital out of the public taxes is unjust, since it burdens the many in the interest of a particular class, the

answer is that each one pays taxes in proportion to the work that he does. According to the same measure he also employs capital. But even if one does not employ capital himself, or does not employ it in the same proportion in which he pays taxes, he is still held to benefit from its use on the principle that every increase in production is equally distributed among all.

Another objection to the principle of free capital is that as long as capital is free to all there can be no guarantee that it will fall into the most capable hands, or be applied to those branches of industry that have most need of it. Here again the answer is ready at hand that owing to the mobility of labor, which is a corollary from the principle of free association, labor always seeks its best market by applying itself to those branches of industry which yield the largest profits. When the profits in a given industry happen to fall below the normal level that industry will fail to attract laborers, and even lose some of those which it has, until the lessened product raises the price, and with it the profits, to the required level. Hence the logical effect of the mobility of labor is to establish a uniform level of profits in all industries. But this is never completely realized for the reason that labor is not perfectly mobile even in Freeland; hence a certain amount of inequality is inevitable. In many instances, of course, existing inequalities cannot be immediately known or corrected. In other instances, difficult or dangerous kinds of labor must be rewarded with larger profits than the easier and more agreeable kinds in order to attract the requisite number of workers. Still another source of inequality is to be found in the premiums, which are paid to the older members of an association, and which have the effect of attaching the veteran laborer to his work, even after the general level of profits in that particular industry has been materially diminished. Similar to these wage premiums in their effect on profits are the salaries of directors and superintendents, which, more or less arbitrarily fixed, vary greatly from industry to industry and thus prevent the absolute equalization of profits.

The workers are appointed to the different grades and locations of land in precisely the same way in which they are apportioned, or apportion themselves, to the different industries. The better and more desirable lands by attracting more workers yield smaller and smaller profits, according to the law of diminishing returns, until they fall to the level of the profits obtained from the poorer grades of land.

Freeland is an industrial democracy, and the character of its government is very largely determined by its economic needs. The chief postulates of its political philosophy are the following: that every one has an equal and inalienable claim upon the land and other means of production accumulated by the community; that women, children, old men, and men incapable of work, have a right to a maintenance fairly proportionate to the level of the average wealth of the community; that no one can be hindered from the active exercise of his own free individual will so long as he does not infringe upon the rights of others.

The legislative and executive branches of the government—there is no judicial branch—are both divided into twelve departments corresponding to the main divisions of industry. Each of these departments has its legislative assembly and executive board. While every legislative assembly is elective the basis of election varies. Those which are concerned with the general interests of the community, such as education, art, science, sanitation and maintenance, are elected on the basis of residence. In other cases where particular interests are involved the electors vote according to calling. The numerical strength of these legislative assemblies varies from thirty to a hundred and twenty. Some sit continuously, while others meet merely for a few days once a year. Legislative service is paid for at the rate of eight labor hours for each day of actual service. When matters affecting several departments of industry are to be determined all the legislative bodies concerned sit together. One of the most important functions of

the legislative assemblies is the appointment of the highest executive officials who in turn appoint the inferior ones.

While every elector is free to enroll himself in any calling with which he prefers to vote, he is expected to confine his political activity to that branch of public affairs which he understands, or thinks he understands, best. To do otherwise would be to invite severe public condemnation. And in giving his vote in that branch of industry with which he has affiliated himself the elector is again expected to vote for the candidate who in his judgment is best qualified for the place. It follows, therefore, that every branch of the public administration is in the hands of experts. Women have the same right to vote as men, but with few exceptions they refrain from voting in those elections which concern only particular callings. In those elections, however, in which the voting is according to residence, they usually take an active interest; and not infrequently they sit in the legislative assemblies for education, art, science, sanitation and maintenance, although they take no part in the executive.

The maintenance of women, children, the aged, and the incapable, constitutes an important department of the government. Only in rare instances, that is, when exceptional gifts justify it, are women permitted to engage in any calling other than teaching and nursing. When they engage in any calling they are paid for their services the same as men. Single women who are neither teachers nor nurses receive thirty per cent. of the average income of the working part of the population. For married women the allowance is fifteen per cent., and for each of the first three children in a household it is five per cent. All men over sixty years of age, and all sick or incapable, receive forty per cent. All these allowances are not only high enough to command much more than the necessities of life, but they are constantly increasing because based on the average income of the working part of the population.

This system of maintenance is based on the general principle that the wealth of an individual is not the product of his

own capabilities but an heritage from previous generations, which belongs to the weak and incapable no less than to the strong and capable. And as to women, there is the additional principle that they are unfitted by nature to wage an active struggle for existence, and that their destiny is limited to the function of propagation and the beautifying and refining of life. The only reason why women are given smaller allowances than men is, not that their claims are regarded as less, but that their needs are less.

The average income upon which these allowances are based varies from year to year, but has steadily increased from the beginning owing to the extraordinary productivity of the soil and the unlimited use of machinery. The first year it was £160; at the end of the twenty-fifth year it had increased to £600. During the same period the average working day decreased from six hours to five. Because of the excessive heat in the middle of the day the hours of labor are from five to ten in the morning and from four to six in the afternoon. But no one is required to observe these hours. In those callings in which work cannot be intermitted the minimum number of laborers is secured during the hot hours of the day and at night by the payment of higher wages.

But money income by itself affords no index of economic well-being. Prices must likewise be taken into account. The first year a cwt. of flour cost 7s., a fat ox 12s., a complete suit of good woolen clothing 20s. to 30s. Lodgings for single persons cost no more at the most than £2 a year. In later years prices became higher, but the average money income, and with it all maintenance allowances, rose much more. But real incomes are even larger than they appear to be, from a comparison of money incomes and prices, because of the fact that many forms of service, which elsewhere must be paid out of private income, are in Freeland furnished gratuitously by the commonwealth. Thus traveling is absolutely free to all, whether by rail, or by water, or by electric conveyance. The same is true of electric lighting, the post, the telegraph and the telephone. Education, too, is free in all grades and departments.

The commonwealth does so much more for its citizens than is done by other nations that it requires extraordinary sources of income. But the national budget is a marvel of simplicity. To furnish the necessary capital for all forms of industry, to provide the large amounts required for education, to erect and maintain the necessary public buildings, to improve the means of communication and transportation, and to maintain the women and children and those incapacitated from work, the sole dependence of the commonwealth is a tax on income, which averages about thirty-five per cent. of the net income. No one regards this as a burdensome tax, since it is all expended for the common good and must necessarily return to the individual again in various forms of benefit. It is not to be regarded as a deduction from net income so much as an outlay deducted from the gross product with which to carry on the business.

That such a tax meets all the technical requirements of a good tax appears from the fact that there is no source of income except labor, that the income of everyone is exactly known, and that the tax is imposed at the source of the income. Hence there can be neither evasion nor discrimination, and the tax is, therefore, also a just one. The tax is apportioned by the central bank at which every individual and every association keeps an account. No money is used in domestic business transactions, all payments being made by check on this central bank which credits each one with his earnings and debits him with his expenditures. The loans of capital made to individuals and associations by the commonwealth likewise appear on the books of the bank. In this way the bank is informed of the minutest detail of every business transaction throughout the country, as well as every detail of domestic economy. No one can have any source of income unknown to it.

While certain forms of public expenditure are much higher in Freeland than elsewhere, there are others again, like those for justice and police protection, which, notwithstanding the

fact that they absorb fully ninety per cent. of the national income in other countries, cost nothing in Freeland. There are no courts of justice, since disputes between individuals and associations are settled by arbitration. There is almost no crime, and when it does occur it is not punished but protected. Crime is held to be impossible for men with a normal mental and moral character and living in a community in which all the just interests of every member are equally recognized. Hence casual criminals are regarded as mentally or morally diseased persons, who must be subjected to treatment as long as the public safely in the judgment of competent professional men may require it. These professional men are not magistrates but physicians specially chosen for this purpose. But appeals may be taken from their decisions to a mixed board of physicians and magistrates, who are required to hear the appeal in public.

Freeland is built on large lines in a way that is truly marvelous. In this it differs from all other utopias that aim to initiate the process of social reconstruction through colonial experiments. At the end of the first year it had a population of 95,000 souls, of whom 27,000 were men organized into 218 associations and engaged in 87 different kinds of work. Twenty-four years later the population had increased to 42,000,000—26,000,000 whites and 16,000,000 natives—occupying an area of 580,000 square miles. The total value of products was £7,000,000,000, one-fifth of which was exported to Europe and America. There were 380,000 miles of railroad, 30,000 miles of canals, 3,000 ocean freight steamers with a tonnage of 14,500,000 tons, and 17,800 lake and river steamers with a tonnage of 5,200,000,000 tons. The motive power for these railroads, canals and ships, and for all kinds of machinery, totaled 240,000,000 horse power, more than twice the mechanical power employed by the rest of the world, and averaging nine and a half horse power, or the equivalent of 120 laborers, for every inhabitant.

The story closes with a brief account of the extension of

the principles on which Freeland is founded over the civilized world. Its marvelous success had prompted numerous attempts at imitation, which were not infrequently accompanied by revolutionary uprisings, bloodshed and anarchy. With the purpose of reaching a common understanding, and making it possible to prosecute the task of social reconstruction with a minimum of disorder and violence, it was determined to invite all the nations of the earth to a conference. To this conference held in Freeland 68 nations sent 425 delegates.

The first edition of *Freiland* was quickly followed by three others in abridged form. In less than two years it had been translated into a number of languages, while more than a thousand local unions had been formed, chiefly in Germany and Austria, to provide the means of starting a colony. These local unions embraced all classes of people and were later united in an International Freeland Society. In March, 1891, it was announced from Vienna that a suitable tract of land could be had in British East Africa. In the end, however, insuperable difficulties developed and the project failed.

LANCASTER, PA.

## VIII.

### THE STARS NOT INHABITED.<sup>1</sup>

A. T. G. APPLE.

This is the title of one of the latest attempts to answer a query that has never ceased to trouble the minds of people ever since the dawn of astronomy. Professor Townsend puts no interrogation mark at the end of his title. It is rather the opposite: he is perfectly sure of his conclusions. The question is decisively negatived from every approach, but chiefly from the two points of view, that of natural science, and that of philosophy and theology. The first half of the book is occupied with a demolition of the arguments adduced from time to time by imaginative astronomers who let fancy run in various excursions through the universe in an attempt to picture what might be. This half is a rather interesting assemblage of quotations from various writers giving their standpoint, or fancy, on the question of the habitability of other worlds. As advocates of the theory mention is made of Dr. Chalmers, the Herschels, father and son, La Place, Prof. Mitchell, Sir Richard Owen, Isaac Taylor, Arago, Bruno, Nola, Kepler, Tycho, Fontenelle, while quotations are adduced from Newcomb, Flammarion, Brewster, Lodge, Brashear, Lardner, Elliott, Paliza, and Howe, and additional opinions respecting the possibilities of communications with inhabitants of Mars are quoted from Lowell, Pickering, W. H., and Todd. One could follow the argument with more assurance were it not for a certain carelessness of statement and misstatements frequently appearing.

<sup>1</sup> "The Stars Not Inhabited," Prof. L. T. Townsend, D.D., S.T.D., pp. 250. Eaton and Mains, New York.

It shows carelessness to confuse the two brothers Edward C. and William H. Pickering. It is not true that the projected 100-inch reflector is in use on Mt. Wilson; it is only lately it became possible to find a glass disc fit to make the mirror while its completion is still in the future. The assertion that the sun is "several million degrees hotter than the hottest of our atmospheres" is far and away beyond the highest estimate the most reckless has dared to attribute to that very uncertain quantity, the Sun's temperature. It is carelessness to state the diameter of Saturn as "seventy-three millions of miles" when it is only seventy thousand. In trying to prove that no planets revolving about the fixed stars could have inhabitants the author uses the star Capella as an example, and finds that, considering its intense heat, a planet would have to be so far away as to be in danger of entanglement with other systems. Putting his figures to the test we find that, granting Capella to be 128 times hotter than our sun, a planet might be placed in an orbit where it would receive no more heat than we do from our sun and yet be relatively no nearer to disturb us than an ant wandering twelve inches from its nest would threaten another ant thirty-three miles away, while the nearest star-nest would be still four or five miles away. The way in which Darwinism and Evolution are treated indiscriminately in the endeavor to prove that scientists generally are abandoning the doctrine of evolution shows that the philosophy of the book has been little more successful in escaping confusion than its mathematics.

Aside from these shortcomings, the main argument of the first section of the book we believe to be valid. The arguments for the habitability, first of Mars, are examined with the verdict, "not proven." The main reliance for the contention that there is rational life on Mars rests in the reputed existence of intricate series of fine straight lines radiating from numerous minute dots scattered over the surface of the planet. As figured by those who claim to see them they create the impression of a billiard ball enclosed in a fabric of

fine woven net work. The perfect straightness of these markings, and the claim that new ones are being continually formed constitute the principal basis on which is founded the whole claim that there are intelligent beings at the other end to engineer the forces that result in this appearance. And as it is further claimed that these fine lines appear and disappear coincidentally with the diminishing or the increase of extensive white patches covering the poles of Mars; and as the changes in these pole-caps coincide with the Martian seasons, ground is afforded for the theory that the fine lines are an extensive irrigation system by which water is brought from the melting polar snows, which stimulates vegetable growth for great distances on either side the main canal, and it is these strips of vegetation that give to us the impression of dark lining seen in some drawings of Mars. It is easy to see that the argument narrows itself down to this: straight markings cannot occur in nature, therefore the markings on Mars must be artificial, and therefore the crux of the whole matter is, first the reality of the markings, and then the validity of the primary contention. Certain it is that markings are seen on Mars. But they are so extremely faint as to be barely within the limits of visibility, —a region where vision is given to playing all manner of pranks upon the observer especially where it gets the suggestion of a wish or a preconceived idea. So to account for the appearances we have the theory of the "ray illusion" suggested by Prof. Douglass who formerly was an assistant at Flagstaff, according to which radiant lines are apt to appear diverging from a minute dot at the limit of vision. We do not think this will explain the appearances. The "canals" have something more to go on than mere illusion. However doubtful we may be as to their straightness or continuity, the fact remains, they are there. They have been photographed,—albeit very faintly,—and the principal ones always show up in the same place. At this point the Greenwich astronomers come in with a rather interesting experiment. A white disc upon which were scattered irregular specks and dots was placed at the one

end of a long room and a number of students at various distances were asked to sketch what they saw. The result was a number of drawings strikingly like those of the Martian canals, especially in the case of those draughtsmen not too near the object sketched. And so the theory at Greenwich and other European observatories is that Mars is covered with markings similar to those seen on the moon, and these owing to their distance, and also the disturbances always present in the atmosphere, the eye, and even the camera, sees as lines. In support of this contention comes M. Antoniadi, director of the Mars section of the British Astronomical Association, with the claim that with the superior power of the great refractor at Mendon in France, he could see these lines broken up into irregular markings. Director Campbell, of the Lick observatory, corroborates this testimony with the facetious remark that their telescope on Mt. Hamilton is "too strong to show the canals." The great difficulty in the controversy over the reality of the appearances lies in the different quality of the "seeing" in different parts of the world, whether the outlook is over a great city, or from the calm heights of a desert plateau. And here is exactly where Professor Lowell bases his challenge to the astronomical world to "come to Flagstaff and see for yourselves," though the force of the challenge may be somewhat blunted by the fact that his most determined opponents sit on Mt. Hamilton in the finest atmosphere in the world. Then a still greater difficulty is found in the varying degrees of talent for good drawing found in different observers, and the different "styles" in those of equal talent. One pictures what he sees in an artistic imaginative way, another puts down everything in a severe, mathematical, scientific manner. There are impressionists, and there are cubists, as well as realists among astronomers too. Prof. Wm. H. Pickering is just now engaged in a study which may result in clearing up many apparent contradictions. In addition to extensive studies of his own carried forward in the clear atmosphere of Jamaica, he is endeavoring to bring

together all available drawings made in different parts of the world by a great variety of observers. By comparing these, especially when they happen to be made at the same hour, some idea can be gained of the personal peculiarities of each astronomer, what might be called his "personal equation" can be made out, and the way cleared for getting at the objective basis of his particular drawing. In this way the work of each observatory can be appraised, and the truth arrived at by a study of resemblances instead of divergences.

The reality established of what is seen, the question is by no means settled. It remains to decide can Nature unaided by art produce straight lines on so vast a scale as appears on Mars. Here again astronomers are divided. Prof. Lowell and his adherents maintain that it is impossible. Straight lines may form naturally in crystalline forms, but when the scale of a planet is met it is different. On the other hand, Prof. W. H. Pickering from a study of volcanic forms in Hawaii, and from the white rays surrounding some lunar volcanoes, concludes that nature forces can under certain conditions produce results very strongly suggesting the "canals" of Mars. The mud cracks, cracks in asphalt, and "craze" in Japanese pottery which Prof. Townsend figures in the work under review, we do not think prove anything, as they are on such a totally different scale. For the same reason his analogies drawn from snow, frost, and other crystals are beside the point.

Let it be granted, however, that the canals are irrigating waterways, it remains to show how water can be conveyed across thousands of miles of desert in an atmosphere not more than one tenth the density of our own, and where the boiling point of that water must be reduced to  $84^{\circ}$  Fahrenheit and the rapidity of its evaporation immensely increased in consequence. While we do not consider this objection insuperable, there are a number of authorities cited by Professor Townsend who consider it fatal to the theory.

Again the stupendous engineering difficulties of constructing an irrigation system compared to which the Panama canal

itself is but the puddling of school children in the gutter of a summer shower, cause others to turn from the theory of artificial construction. The answer is ingenious. Since gravitation is so much less on Mars owing to its much smaller size, the man in the trenches there could lift a shovelful just three times as great as the terrestrial digger, and the work, whether done by pick and shovel or by machinery, would go forward just three times as fast as it would on the earth. One authority quoted attempts to reconstruct on a rational basis, the Martian physique. These people, owing to the extreme rarity of the atmosphere, must have an unusual extent of lung surface requiring enormously enlarged chest development, while with the extreme lightness of weight nature would practice her usual economy by setting them on legs the stoutness of a collie dog, a conjecture about as likely to be true as H. G. Wells's conception of a soft body of brain-like substance which through disuse has lost all bone and muscle tissue, and must enclose itself for protection in metal casings whence issue long electrically propelled cranes and levers by which the Martian walks about on stilts, catches its prey, and in the absence of a digestive apparatus nourishes its life by transfusion of the living blood of its victim.

And so after a weighing of arguments pro and con Professor Townsend comes to the conclusion that "such conceptions and statements [that Mars is inhabited by rational beings] from a scientific point of view, never have been less rational than at this very moment."

Mars disposed of, the remaining planets require less attention. Conditions are in the case of each planet so different from those obtaining on the earth that no one who has studied the physical aspects of the problem, for a moment thinks of attributing rational inhabitants to any other of our planets. The great and significant fact of uniformity revealed by the spectroscope convinces us now that the range of conditions under which life is possible on the earth must be substantially the same as on any other cosmic body. The hydrogen and

helium of a distant star behave in their reactions, physically and chemically, exactly as they do in the laboratory, and therefore we have no reason to assume (as an extreme case) fire-proof protoplasm existing in the sun or the stars and containing a form of life different from that with which we are acquainted.

The second part of our book concerns the philosophical and theological points of view. The ancient world believed in astrology, which is interpreted by our author as the result of a belief that the stars were inhabited, though if there was any idea of inhabitants in the ancient mind, ignorant as it was of the real size and distance of the stars, it must have been spiritistic in character and very different from the modern conception. The Biblical writers, in contrast with the heathen world, warned their disciples against astrology as savoring of witchcraft, and by their silence as to any other rational beings besides men and women, intended us to understand that the stars were not inhabited. The high estate which they attribute to man is interpreted absolutely by our author, and made to rule out any other orders of being in the universe, not only superiors but equals. The uniqueness of man, moreover, is proven by the whole doctrine of the Fall, Redemption, Vicarious Atonement, the Trinity and Christology, and these doctrines are therefore opposed to the belief in inhabitants on other worlds. The argument is far from convincing. All that is said would remain true whether or not rational beings existed in some favored planet revolving about some distant star. To the challenge "*cui bono*" in the face of the vast expanse of the cosmos the only answer is, "to incite man to wonder, study, and adore." It is a pretty conceit that pictures the stars as a "vast belfry of the sky trying to call the children of men away from their petty businesses and their useless and tiresome controversies to a religious service of prayer and praise in this vast temple not made with hands." The demand "why this waste?"—these millions on millions of suns and attendant planets—is met by the reminder that nature knows

no waste where she creates millions of seeds and eggs that never mature. At the same time, notwithstanding that in addition to this we see this apparent waste growing more and more prodigal as we descend the scale of being, yet to think of only one world inhabited in the universe and all the rest a deserted waste—well it rather offends our social instincts. The argument fails to convince.

The question is an indeterminate one,—not enough equations for the unknown quantities, and so will never cease to have its pull on the imagination rather than the reason. It is of but little practical moment. Its discussion serves only as a sort of exercise to test a writer's expertness in either physical social, or theological science. The inhabited planet is a sort of Utopia land to which new experiments can be removed now that the geography of our own planet has been practically worked out. There is, however, an interest in the various answers given the question, in that they are usually a reflection of the attitude of mind of the age in which they were made. So that we find the answer given by Christian Huyghens in the end of the seventeenth century very different from that made by E. Walter Maunder in the twentieth. At the time the former wrote astronomy was practically in its infancy: physics was only making a beginning with its vast fields unexplored; nothing was known of electricity and magnetism, the spectroscope was unknown, and the telescope even was a crude and cumbersome affair. So the astronomer had free rein for the imagination in picturing conditions on the planets, sun, and stars. Wm. Hershel could describe the surface of the sun as conducive to intelligent life in such fulness that he would call it heaven, with no one able to say him nay. Huyghens in his little treatise in a bright chatty manner conducts the reader from planet, to sun, to star, finding inhabitants swarming everywhere, and he does not even slight the satellites, and the asteroids. Physical laws count for nothing, fancy and imagination everything; and yet our guide is the man who first attached a pendulum to a clock and gave the world its most rigorously exact measurement, time.

Quite differently is the subject handled by the twentieth century inquirer. Fancy must now walk circumspectly. The conditions under which life can exist are accurately known, the laws of physics are clearly searched out; it is found that the conditions that make life possible are by far more numerous and intricate than was once supposed. And each new necessary condition decreases manifold the chances of finding a place in the universe where the environment is possessed of all the qualities of a life-bearing one, and this notwithstanding the persistent tendency of life to establish itself wherever there is the very least possibility—in deserts dry or hot springs in the volcanic valley. So the answer of the second writer mentioned above, Professor Maunder, is quite different from the answer of the eighteenth century. The tendency of astronomers is now reversed and there is a strong disposition to answer the question of cosmic inhabitants in the negative. At the same time the conclusions of Professor Maunder are far from being as sweeping as those of Professor Townsend. Bound by no dogmatic presuppositions, he sees the possibility of frequent cases in planets attending solar stars on which rational beings might be expected. Though owing to the necessity of so large a number of favorable conditions coinciding, we must expect a much larger number of worlds that have either failed of inhabitants, because of the premature ripening of one condition or the tardy perfection of another; or we must expect a large number on the other hand that are not ready yet for habitation. And taking into account the comparatively short time of habitability as compared to the preparatory period, and the period of exhaustion, we must say that the number of habitable worlds in the solar system is confined to the earth alone, and among the stellar systems must be very much rarer than has been supposed by many writers.

LANCASTER, PA.

## IX.

### NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

**JOHN HUSS: HIS LIFE, TEACHINGS, AND DEATH AFTER FIVE HUNDRED YEARS.** By David S. Schaff, D.D., Professor of Church History in the Western Theological Seminary. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. \$2.50 net.

This volume was doubtless prepared in view of the celebration of the five-hundredth anniversary of the martyrdom of John Huss. Few men in this country were better fitted to write it than Dr. Schaff. His reputation as a church historian was established when he published Volume V, in two parts, of Schaff's Church History. The extensive researches into the history of the middle ages required by this work prepared him for writing the monograph on John Huss. Evidences of his mastery of the later mediæval period are found on every page. The author, also, thoroughly familiarized himself with the doctrines of Huss by his translation into English of the Latin treatise on the Church. Besides he had access to the recently discovered and published work of Huss on the Sentences of Peter Lombard which has not been accessible to earlier biographers. He, also, made use of all the editions of the complete work of Huss as well as of Flajshans' recent edition of separate works. These sources and authorities are cited in the Preface. The book is both comprehensive and accurate in its details. It leaves little more to be desired. It is probably the latest and most scholarly treatise on the Bohemian Reformer in the English language.

In the first chapter the background of Huss's life is clearly sketched. He describes the ideals of the Church in which he grew up and by which he was condemned. The Papacy, the Church, and the Inquisition are mentioned as the great mediæval constructions. Against each of these institutions Huss entered protest. The author cites five distinct reformatory groups, each in its own way opposing the claims of papal absolutism. Huss belonged to one of these.

His training as a priest, his part in the University of Prague, his preaching in the Bethlehem Chapel, his debt to Wyclif, his national leadership, his revolt against the Archbishop and the Pope, are described in successive chapters. Chapters seven to eleven contain a vivid account of his withdrawal from Prague, his appearance before the Council of Constance, and his martyrdom at the stake. Of special merit is chapter eleven, defining Huss's place in history, his relation to his predecessors, his contemporaries, and the reformers of the sixteenth century.

The style is clear and easily holds the attention of the reader. While the book is scholarly, it is none the less popular, and should be commended not only to ministers but also to the intelligent laymen of the Church.

GEORGE W. RICHARDS.

CAPTAIN JOHN SMITH. By Rossiter Johnson. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pp. 190. Price 50 cents.

This biography is one of a series published by the Macmillan Company under the general title of *True Stories of Great Americans*. The books in the series which have already come from the press are Robert Fulton, Benjamin Franklin, Robert E. Lee and the volume before us on Captain John Smith. The writers of these volumes are emphasizing those events in the lives of great Americans which are calculated to appeal to the younger reader. The story of John Smith is attractively told by one who is not only accurate as an historian but who at the same time has an appreciation of what makes really good juvenile literature. If our boys and girls would read graphic, vivid, trustworthy biographies such as is this life of John Smith, instead of poring over the so-called imaginary tales of adventure or the cheap modern historical novels which are neither historical nor in any worthy sense of the word novels, they would get an insight into real adventure and real history that would serve to put a spur to their ambition. Sunday Schools and public school libraries would do well to procure the volumes of this series.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

GETTING A WRONG START. A Truthful Autobiography. Anonymous. New York, The Macmillan Company. Pp. 234. Price \$1.00.

We have in this volume the fascinating story of a man who spent the first forty-five years of his life in an attempt to find himself, and who after various failures eventually succeeded in filling a prominent place in literature and business. He writes this autobiography in the hope that it will be of use to some young man or older man who perhaps has lost heart in the long, hard struggle of getting on in the world. He writes for those who think they have failed. "For," says he, "truth is sometimes stranger than fiction. By no possibility could any man make more mistakes than I have made, make a worse start originally or make more bad starts later on in life. If success may begin after forty-five for one man, it may do so for others. It is that conviction alone which induces me to write."

The book is exceedingly readable. It tells of a young man of good parentage, and of splendid college training suddenly thrown out into the world without any definite plan, and simply floundering. He tries a dozen different things and fails in each. The

pages of the book are really a full and honest confession of a man who was a rolling stone for more than half a life time. It is an attempt to analyze the question why he did not succeed in his early efforts.

A touch of romance is given to his story as he confides to his readers the fact that when his prospects were poorest an heroic woman came into his life. Then came the long road that turned. When he ceased to be a rolling stone he gathered moss. With evident good humor he describes how the world which almost left him starve in the days of his hardest struggles beckoned him and discovered him and tried to honor him as soon as his books were listed among the best sellers. He describes too how he got a respectable footing in the business world as soon as royalties began to come in.

The writer's idea of success is by no means measured by financial standards. It is rather the finding of a place of real usefulness in the world adapted to one's capacities and inclinations. The book closes with some splendid advice to men who are halting or dismayed at what life is sending against them.

The style is simple, direct, straightforward. The interest is sustained throughout. The reader closes the book feeling that he has really been helped.

H. M. J. KLEIN.

**THE BIBLE AND LIFE.** By Edwin Holt Hughes, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Published by the Methodist Book Concern, New York and Cincinnati. Price \$1.00 net.

This volume consists of a series of lectures delivered before the students of DePauw University. They are known as the Mendenhall Lectures; and are the first of a series to be delivered annually under the foundation endowed by the Rev. Marmaduke H. Mendenhall. The foundation consists of an endowment of ten thousand dollars "to found a permanent lectureship on the evidences of the Divine Origin of Christianity."

In the introduction the author says that he "does not claim to be a Biblical scholar in the technical sense. Nor did he deem that the primary need of the students whom he addressed would be met by a discussion of theories of inspiration or of dates and authorship. College students have a passion for reality, and the most convincing apologetic for them is the argument from actual living." This determined the nature and the scope of the discussion, which the author has undertaken in these lectures. We think he was wise in the selection of his method. The lectures throughout are based on the teachings of the Bible, and these are everywhere tested by the fruits which they have produced in the life of men and of nations. The scope of the lectures may be pretty fairly estimated from the topics discussed: The Bible and

Life; The Bible and Man; The Bible and Home; The Bible and Education; The Bible and Work; The Bible and Wealth; The Bible and Sorrow; The Bible and Practice.

The lectures throughout are wholesome; and De Pauw University is to be congratulated on the auspicious beginning of the new lectureship. The author's estimate of the Bible is sound, and the presentation of his subject such as must have given inspiration to the young people addressed. Here are a few sentences, which reveal in part the spirit which pervades the lectures. "The Bible was written by life, and the Bible was selected by life." "The Bible grew from life. The Bible was tested by life. The Bible climaxes in Life." "It would be too much to say that all revelation ceases with the closing of the canon. Lowell's claim that the Bible of the race is written slowly, that each race adds its texts of hope and despair, of joy and moan, and that the prophets still sit at the feet of God, cannot be denied." "The Bible is what it is, no matter what theory men may adopt as to its formation. It creates its own evidences. The argument for its inspiration is the life that it inspires." There is much more of the same kind, showing that the author is modern in his conception and alive to the deepest needs of the young men in our colleges.

The lectures seem to be printed just as they were delivered. The style is hence somewhat diffuse. While that was doubtless necessary in order to make the subject clear to young minds in the course of oral delivery, it somewhat detracts from the printed form in which the lectures are now presented. Yet even with this drawback, the book is to be commended. Many persons, who do not require scholarly and technical discussions, will find much in these lectures that is edifying and helpful.

WM. C. SCHAEFFER.

VARIETY IN THE PRAYER MEETING. By William T. Ward. The Methodist Book Concern, New York and Cincinnati. Pp. 192. Price 50 cents.

The author of this book was evidently constrained to write on the subject it proposes, because he shares with a multitude of ministers the conviction that the prayer meeting of this age of church activity is fast losing its accustomed place in the life and experience of believers. This doubtless accounts for the fact that he proposes in the contents of his book a great variety of methods and ingenious suggestions, for the leaders of prayer meetings, which if experimented with are likely to temporarily at least revive the interest, and increase attendance. For those who are puzzled, at every turn, to know what to do next, in order to arouse their people to a new interest in the prayer meeting, the book is most valuable.

The question which naturally arises, however, is whether the more or less artificial methods of attaining a certain measure of

visible success in this department of the Church are justifiable, and promising of worthy fruits, in view of the general apathy of church members toward the prayer meeting. It is coming to be acknowledged, apparently, that there is a great number of both ministers and laymen who do not see the need of this meeting in the church's life in the present age, for reasons that we cannot enter into here. Whether this be so or not, and especially while it is not universally acknowledged to be so, this book is welcome, for the help which it may render many hard working, sincere pastors who are battling with the prayer meeting service. The book contains a valuable bibliography in the appendix, which will help those who desire to study this subject more extensively.

W. STUART CRAMER.

A BOY'S RELIGION. By Edwin Holt Hughes. The Methodist Book Concern, New York and Cincinnati. Pp. 119. Price 50 cents.

This little book is written out of the experience and observation of its bishop-author. Its value is in the emphasis which it lays upon the home, teacher and pastor as determining agencies and influences in behalf of the religious temper and life of the boy. It is a very sane treatment of the boy problem, from the point of view of his early religious impressions and culture. It is practical rather than theoretical, taking the boy as he is, and suggesting the recognition of facts in his life which must be recognized and dealt with, by that method which is within the reach of parental and pastoral ability. The author does not encourage reliance upon miraculous spiritual powers for the boy's new birth, but advises the application of influences and discipline, which, when exercised with spiritual motives, will call forth the latent divine powers that are within him. The environment in which he will be most effectively helped is the Christian home, where God and His ideals of life, as revealed in Jesus Christ, are exemplified by God-fearing and respecting parents. The opportunity of the pastor and the church grows out of such a home, when parents are interested and active in the life of the church, and the pastor is a welcome visitor. This little book should be read by both parents and children.

W. STUART CRAMER.

JOHN HUS, THE MARTYR OF BOHEMIA, A STUDY OF THE DAWN OF PROTESTANTISM. By W. N. Schwarze, Ph.D., Professor of Church History in the Moravian College and Theological Seminary, Bethlehem, Pa. New York, Fleming H. Revell Company, 1915. Pp. 152. Price 75 cents.

This readable and authoritative short study of John Hus, The Martyr of Bohemia, comes from where one would naturally turn for it, the department of church history in the Theological Seminary of the Moravian Church, "The Renewed Church of the

Hussites." John Hus was burned at the stake (July 6, 1415) at Constance, Germany. He was the last of a group of men who have been styled the forerunners of the Reformation, and has frequently been referred to as "the morning star of the Reformation," for in his wake there followed the full daylight of the evangelical doctrine, which through the leadership of Zwingli, Luther, Calvin, and Knox, has encircled the whole world. In many respects he may be said to have begun the Reformation, and if circumstances had been more favorable he would undoubtedly have become the great leader of the opposition to Romanism.

The salient events in the life of the Bohemian reformer, especially his trial and death at Constance, are related in the stirring style and fashion of his fearless defiance of the Roman hierarchy; and his influence in the great revolt against papal authority in the fifteenth century is traced with a discerning eye. Well has this little book been styled "a study in the Dawn of Protestantism." Not only should this timely and popular study of Hus, prepared in commemoration of the five hundredth anniversary of his martyrdom, appeal to all Protestants and lovers of freedom of conscience and of government everywhere; but in a special sense to members of the Reformed Church, which was vitally related to the followers of Hus in the past and in whose folds most of his followers are found today.

JOHN BAER STOUT.